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This paper develops and simulates a dynamic model of strategic telecom competition. The goal is to understand how
regulatory policy, particularly relative to lease charges for local network elements, affects telecom competition,
investment, retail prices, and consumer welfare. The model assumes two products, local voice service and data
(broadband), and three types of players  n the regional Bell operating companies, referred to as incumbent local
exchange carriers (ILECs), cable companies (Cables), and competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). The game
begins with a) ILECs established in each county with respect to the provision of local voice and data services and
b) Cables established in roughly half of the counties with respect to the provision of data.There are one-time fixed
costs of entering a county, product- and period-specific costs of operating in a county, and marginal costs of
supplying each product. Economies of scope reduce the fixed entry and operating costs of supplying both products
in a given county at a given point in time. Finally, in supplying telecom services in a given county, CLECs may enter
by leasing ILEC infrastructure at specified access rates. The requirement that ILECs allow CLECs to lease their local
network facilities was established in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as part of a quid pro quo that promised
ILECs entry into the long distance market. But the ILECs continue to contest the quid.  The ILECs support their
position by suggesting that leased access reduces telecom investment and output and raises telecom prices. Our
model considers the entire range of options available to each of the players, but it reaches the opposite conclusion.
Indeed, we find thatif UNE-P rates were set at the Supreme Court-approved total element long-run incremental cost
(TELRIC) levels, telecom investment and employment outlays would increase by over one fifth in counties
containing the majority of the U.S. population and by over 30 percent in counties containing almost a third of the
population. The present value of telecom outlays over the next 5 and 20 years would rise by $71 billion and $155
billion, respectively.  On average, the switch from actual to TELRIC UNE rates would lower local phone rates across
the country’s 3108 counties by $57 per year, generating annual total savings to consumers of $15 billion. Almost
two fifths of the population would experience reductions in local phone rates of 20 percent or more. Over one fifth
would experience rate reductions of 30 percent or more. These findings of price reductions are based on a fairly
conservative parameterization of our model with respect to the specification of true ILEC and CLEC incremental
long-run production costs.
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I.  Introduction 
A vibrant telecom sector is remarkably important to national economic 
performance.  Two-thirds of U.S. economic growth appears driven by innovations in 
information technology.
3  And telecom, which plays an essential role in information 
acquisition and dissemination, accounts for the lion’s share of IT investment and 
innovation.  Unfortunately, after booming during the second half of the 1990s, the 
telecom industry has fallen on hard times.
4 
What explains the decline in the telecom sector? The regional Bell operating 
companies, referred to as ILECs (incumbent local exchange carriers), blame it on their 
competitors, known as CLECs (competitive local exchange carriers).  The CLECs blame 
it on the ILECs and the failure of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to 
vigorously enforce the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA96).  This act required the 
ILECs to lease, at wholesale rates, telephone lines and the other bottleneck facilities they 
control to CLECs so that CLECs too could market local voice and broadband services.  
To ensure ILEC compliance with its provisions, TA96 dangled a very big carrot, namely 
allowing ILECs to enter the long distance market.    
According to the CLECs, the ILECs have used every means at their disposal to 
stymie competition based on leased access and have failed to comply not only with the 
spirit, but also with the letter of TA96.  For their part, the ILECs claim that competition 
based on leased access is synthetic and greatly limits their own incentives to invest.  
While the two sides have been arguing, the FCC has made three decisions that will 
                                                           
3 See Jorgenson, Dale, “Information Technology and the U.S. Economy,” American Economic Review, vol. 
91, no. 1 (March 2001), 1-32. The Commerce Department’s estimate of the contribution of information 
technology to economic growth is smaller.  
4 Extremely recent data may suggest that the industry is starting to rebound.    2
significantly affect future competition in telecom.  The first is to permit all four regional 
Bell operating companies to enter the long distance market notwithstanding the fact that 
CLECs have yet to secure more than 15 percent of the local voice market.
5  The second is 
to reaffirm the role of state public utility commissions (PUCs) in setting conditions under 
which CLECs can lease either individual ILEC facilities or “platforms” of interconnected 
ILEC telephone lines, switches, and transport services.  This latter option is referred to as 
UNE-P, which stands for unbundled network element platform, because in renting these 
elements, the CLECs are, in effect, leasing the entire platform of local network voice 
elements.  In providing their final retail voice services under UNE-P, the CLECs bring to 
these wholesale network-inputs significant customer support and product differentiation.
6   
  The alternative to competing for voice services under UNE-P is for CLECs to 
obtain physical access to customer loops by collocating equipment in ILEC central 
offices.  Leasing access in this manner is called UNE-L (unbundled network element 
loop) because it entails disconnecting the telephone line or loop from the ILEC’s switch 
and reconnecting it to the CLEC’s equipment.  This physical re-termination of the loop is 
called the hot cut process.  Competing under UNE-L turns out to be very difficult, and 
often impossible, due to an array of significant operational and cost impediments.
7   
                                                           
5 Federal Communciations Commission, “Federal Communications Commission Releases Data on Local 
Telephone Competition,” Press release, December 22, 2003.  available at:  
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-242397A1.pdf  
6 The rental of network services at wholesale rates is routine in the long distance and wireless markets.  The 
main difference is that in long distance and wireless markets, there are competing carriers, whereas in the 
local voice and broadband market, the ILECs have a virtual monopoly over the transmission infrastructure.  
Ironically, AT&T is one of the largest CLECs.  When the Bell Telephone Company was broken up in 1983 
into a single long-distance provider, AT&T was compelled to lease access to its long-distance lines.  Today 
the ILECs are leasing these and other long-distance lines to transmit their customers’ voice and data 
messages.   I.e., in the long distance market, both sets of shoes are on different feet.  
7 Operational impediments include the considerable time the ILECs take to implement hot cuts and the 
mistakes, whether intentional or not, that they make in the process.  The costs CLECs face in operating 
under UNE-L include the significant expense of collocating their equipment in the ILEC central offices, of   3
The third FCC decision grants ILECs what, over time, could amount to exclusive 
use of local phone lines to provide high-speed broadband service.
8  Specifically, the FCC 
has indicated that if ILECs add additional fiber to their transmission networks they are no 
longer required to unbundle (lease out) the use of that fiber to those CLECs seeking to 
market broadband under UNE-L.   
These three FCC decisions have been made against the backdrop of an intense 
ILEC-CLEC battle over the proper pricing of UNEs.  The ILECs appealed the FCC’s 
Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) UNE pricing formula all the way to 
the Supreme Court and lost.  But on the heels of the Supreme Court’s affirmation of 
TELRIC, the FCC has opened a proceeding to investigate whether this standard needs to 
be revised
9 – and the ILECs continue to contest UNE pricing at the state level, 
particularly in states that have begun lowering their leasing rates toward TELRIC levels.  
Those states that have dropped their UNE rates have seen a significant increase in UNE-P 
based competition, and their residents have seen their local phone bills drop by as much 
as one third.
10   
                                                                                                                                                                             
renting collocation space from the ILECs, of backhauling loops from the ILEC central offices to their own 
networks, and of switching transmissions.  For CLECs to provide broadband service, they need to have 
physical access to the loop, which means entering the market under UNE-L.  But given the high costs and 
operational impediments of UNE-L, CLECS that provide broadband under UNE-L typically provision the 
voice service under UNE-P.   
8 The latter two decisions were part of the FCC’s Triennial Review of UNEs Order that was announced on 
February 20, 2003.  Subsequently, the FCC issued detailed regulations implementing its February decision.  
These regulations state that ILECs will no longer be required to unbundle facilities to CLECs for purpose 
of data transmission to the extent that these facilities are either modernized or expanded to provide high-
speed fiber optic capacity.   
9 Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in in the Matter of the Review of 
the Commission’s Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements and the Resale of Service 
by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 03-173, released September 15, 2003. 
10 See, Braunstein, Yale M. “The Role of UNE-P in Vertically Integrated Telephone Networks: Ensuring 
Healthy and Competitive Local, Long Distance, and DSL Markets.” University of California, Berkeley, 
May 2003; Michigan Alliance for Competitive Telecommunications press release on “study” – May 15, 
and 2003 “Consumer Savings from Local Telephone Service Competition in Illinois,” released by Illinois 
Coalition for Competitive Telecommunications, February 2003.   4
Given the importance of regulatory policy to the telecom industry and the 
importance of the industry to the economy, it’s essential to have a clear understanding of 
how the telecom sector operates and responds to government actions.  This paper seeks to 
contribute to that understanding by developing and simulating a new dynamic strategic 
model of telecom entry, pricing, and investment.   
Our model features two products -- local voice service and data (broadband) -- 
and three types of players – ILECs, CABLES, and CLECS.  The playing field consists of 
the 3,108 counties in the continental United States.  The game begins with a) ILECs 
providing both local voice and data services in each county; and b) CABLES providing 
data service in roughly half of the counties.  CLECs must decide if and when to enter 
each county and what products to market in those counties they enter.  Multiple equilibria 
in the entry game are resolved via a randomization mechanism that selects equilibria with 
equal probability.  Post-entry market supplies and product prices are determined via 
Cournot competition. 
There are one-time fixed costs of entering a county, product- and period-specific 
costs of operating in the county, and marginal costs of supplying each product.  There are 
also economies of scope that reduce the fixed entry and operating costs of supplying both 
products in a given county at a given point in time.  Finally, in supplying voice in a given 
county, CLECs can potentially lower their costs by leasing ILEC unbundled network 
infrastructure at specified access rates. 
The model’s central message is that TELRIC UNE-based competition can be 
highly effective in lowering voice and broadband prices, enhancing consumer welfare, 
and resurrecting telecom investment.  But the key to making UNE competition work   5
appears to be having state PUCs set platform rental rates at true TELRIC levels, which, 
we estimate, averages about $15.10 per line per month.
11  Thus far, only a few state PUCs 
have set their UNE-P rates close to what we measure to be their own state-specific 
TELRIC levels.  Indeed, average state-specific actual UNE-P rates exceed this estimate 
of average TELRIC UNE-P rates by 27.9 percent.   
  Our model indicates that if UNE rates were set at TELRIC levels throughout the 
country, telecom entry, investment and employment outlays, and output would increase 
significantly and local voice prices would fall significantly.  That is, telecom investment 
and employment outlays would increase by over 20 percent in counties containing the 
majority of the U.S. population and by over 30 percent in counties containing almost a 
third of the population – compared with the outlays that we may expect to occur under a 
continuation of current above-TELRIC UNE prices.  In particular, improved adherence to 
TELRIC would increase telecom investment outlays by $71 billion over the next 5 years.  
And the present value of these outlays over the next 20 years would increase by $155 
billion. 
A switch in each state from current to TELRIC UNE rates would lower local 
phone prices, on average, across the country’s 3108 counties by $57 per household per 
year for an aggregate savings of $15.0 billion per year.  Almost two-fifths of households 
would experience reductions in local phone rates of 20 percent or more.  Over one fifth 
would experience rate reductions of 30 percent or more.   
                                                           
11 Our rough estimate of TELRIC rates starts with rates calculated from the FCC’s 1998 Synthesis Model 
adjusted to report UNE costs.  These rates are then deflated for 5 years at a 5 percent per year to account for 
intervening reductions in input prices and unit costs.  This uniform nationwide calculation provides only a 
rough index of state-by-state TELRICs and should not be construed to support or impeach more targeted, 
specific calculations of TELRIC.   6
The gains from TELRIC-based UNE-based competition are significant across the 
entire spectrum of counties arrayed by income and population density.  Almost a fifth of 
households in low-income – low-density counties begin to enjoy local voice competition 
when the switch is made from current to TELRIC UNE rates.  And households and 
business in such counties experience an 8.7 percent reduction in the cost of their local 
phone service.   
These findings are based on a fairly conservative parameterization of our model 
with respect to the specification of true ILEC and CLEC incremental long-run production 
costs.  With arguably more realistic parameters, the average price of local phone service 
would fall by more than one third in moving from current to TELRIC UNE rates.  And 
much greater price reductions would arise in the voice market were the government to 
require electronic loop provisioning, under which a customer’s local voice transmissions 
would be switched electronically and instantaneously to CLEC facilities at the same 
extraordinary low cost as occurs in the long distance market.
12  Our simulations also 
show significant entry by CLECs in broadband.  Indeed, across cross-county average 
broadband price under TELRIC pricing of UNEs ends up almost 22.9 percent lower than 
the regulated monopoly price.  
In contrast to our findings about the gains from UNE-based competition with 
proper TELRIC pricing, the model indicates that current UNE pricing by some state 
PUCs is a mixed blessing.  PUCs that set UNE prices far above TELRIC can actually end 
up raising voice prices, lowering demand for telecom services, and reducing telecom 
investment and employment outlays.  The reason stems from our assumption that state 
PUCs will phase out their regulation of local retail telecom prices at the first sign of 
                                                           
12 See Kotlikoff, Laurence J., “On the Broadband Mess,” The Milken Review, First Quarter, 2003.    7
competition from CLECs.  Such eventual regulatory “relief” is one of the long-term goals 
of TA96.  But if wholesale prices for UNEs are set too high, competitors will be unable 
to provide service economically to all customers, and substantial segments of the market 
will be served only by a now unregulated monopolist or by an unregulated dominant 
market player.  The resulting “free” market price likely will be higher than the price 
previously set by the regulators.  Stated differently, a regulated monopoly may be 
preferred to an unregulated duopoly or oligopoly if the ILEC can persuade state PUCs to 
maintain above-TELRIC UNE prices and, thereby, raise their rivals’ costs.  Thus, state 
PUCs should understand that abandoning regulation at the first sign of competition may 
have very adverse consequences, and that limited competition may be a very poor 
substitute for full and fair competition.  
This paper reaches its pro-competitive conclusions after considering the empirical 
evidence, reviewing basic lessons about monopoly behavior, and simulating our model 
for all 3108 counties in the continental United States.
13  We proceed in section 2 by 
describing the recent rise and fall of telecom investment.  Section 3 considers the 
argument that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA96) is responsible for the 
industry’s recent distress.  Section 4 presents our model.  Section 5 delivers findings, and 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  The Telecom Investment Boom and Bust 
Table 1 shows total telecom investment since 1990 as well as the investment of 
the CLECs and ILECs.  It is clear that TA96 triggered a huge expansion of investment.  It 
did so by promising CLECs that they would receive access to the local network or 
                                                           
13 Unfortunately, critical data needed to run the model are not available for either Alaska or Hawaii.    8
components (elements) of the local network at a reasonable price and on a timely basis.  
The local network refers to the local telephone lines, telephone poles, underground 
conduits, and switches that connect the American public to the outside word.   
TA96 expanded use of this vital communications pipeline bottleneck by a) 
eliminating the ILECs’ legal status as monopoly franchises and b) requiring the ILECs to 
rent access to the local network to incipient, would-be competitors.  The act further 
required the ILECs to rent access to (to unbundle)  the local network on either a 
component-by-component basis or on a package-of-components basis as requested by 
their competitors.
14  Finally, rents were to be set at a compensatory price that included a 
profit. 
During the 1996-2000 telecom investment boom, over a third of gross and over 
one half of net telecom investment was done by the CLECs even though they were fifteen 
times smaller than the ILECs when measured in terms of revenues.
15  In 2000, at the peak 
of the investment boom, CLECs invested $25 billion, which almost matched the $27 
billion of new ILEC investment.   
Despite investing two-thirds of their revenues, as compared to one quarter by the 
ILECs, CLECs were able to gain only 8.5 percent of nationwide access lines, and only 
4.6 percent of residential and small business lines, by the end of 2000.  The explanation 
for this is straightforward.  CLECs concentrated their investment in dense metropolitan 
                                                           
14 Because local network assets were acquired by the ILECs under concessionary conditions and paid for by 
the public over decades in the form of high, regulated telephone rates for local and long distance telephone 
calls, even these “compensatory” rents may be too high.  
15 Hall, Robert E. and William H. Lehr, “Rescuing Competition to Simulate Telecom Growth,” mimeo, 
September 28, 2001.  Revenues refer here to receipts earned from operations in the local telecom market.   9
areas to a) capture scale and density economies and b) bypass ILEC control of the local 
network by constructing their own pipelines feeding into high-traffic office buildings.
16   
Over the past seven years, state PUCs have adopted a “look-see” approach to 
lowering UNE-P rates and vigorously enforcing TA96.  They have looked to preserve 
ILEC profitability, while also seeing how much competition their policies would 
engender.  Recently, PUCs in a number of major states, including New York, California, 
Illinois, and Michigan, have lowered their UNE rates toward TELRIC levels and have 
required their ILECs to expedite the unbundling process.  In these states, CLEC market 
shares have risen and local voice and broadband retail prices have fallen.
17  
The surge in telecom investment in the last decade was not unique to the United 
States.  According to a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) review of telecommunications policy in OECD member nations, “The evidence 
indicates that opening access networks and network elements to competitive forces 
increases investment and the pace of development.  Nearly all OECD governments have 
                                                           
16 CLECs attribute this need to bypass the ILECs to the fact that the ILECs used and continue to use a 
variety of mechanisms to restrict or degrade access to the local network. Their proposed list of abuses 
includes charging exorbitant prices for unbundling their components (elements), delaying the transfer 
(handoff) of loops (wires) from their own switches to those of competitors, using slow and error-prone 
manual rather than electronic handoffs, charging high prices to CLECs for renting space in ILEC local 
service offices to collect these loops, and simply opting to pay fines rather than obey the law.  CLECs claim 
that these ILEC practices have succeeded in killing off the lion’s share of their number.   
17 For example, one recent estimate finds that local phone customers that switch to CLEC providers can 
save $11.40 per month, or almost $137 a year, in California. See http://www.trac.policy.net/proactive/ 
newsroom/release.vtml?id=18900. A study released by the Michigan Alliance for Competitive 
Telecommunications said consumers in that state saved $72M on local residential phone bills in 2002 
because of competition stimulated by reduced UNE-P rates. A similar study in Illinois said consumers 
spent $131 million less on local residential phone service as competition heated up.  See, Braunstein, Yale 
M. “The Role of UNE-P in Vertically Integrated Telephone Networks: Ensuring Healthy and Competitive 
Local, Long Distance, and DSL Markets.” University of California, Berkeley, May 2003; Michigan 
Alliance for Competitive Telecommunications press release on “study” – May 15, and 2003 “Consumer 
Savings from Local Telephone Service Competition in Illinois,” released by Illinois Coalition for 
Competitive Telecommunications, February 2003.   
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already introduced such policies or taken decisions to introduce such policies, in respect 
to telecommunications networks.”
18  
This evidence notwithstanding, there have been few careful attempts to measure 
the effects of unbundling on price and investment.  One exception -- Willig, Lehr, 
Bigelow, and Levinson (2002) -- gathered detailed data on ILEC investment and 
regulatory regimes and found that lower UNE prices are associated with higher ILEC 
investment in a statistically significant manner --a pattern consistent with the findings 
presented here, including the fact that the investment boom ended when most of the 
CLECs exited or were otherwise driven out of the market. 
 
3.  The ILEC View 
The ILECs have a much different view of the 1996-2001 telecom boom and bust.  
Their explanation of CLEC business failures is that these companies had bad business 
plans, over-invested in telecom, and were poorly managed.  With respect to their own 
investment, the ILECs argue that absent TA96 and TELRIC pricing, they would be 
introducing broadband much more rapidly throughout the country.   
This position is set forth in Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000), Hausman (1997, 1998, 
2000, and 20002), Kahn (1998), and Sidak and Spulber (1997).  Their framework is given 
in equation (1), which equates the expected marginal return from investment to its 
marginal cost.  
(1)   c MPK MR MPK MR g g g b b b = + λ λ ,     
                                                           
18 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2001), p.4.    11
where λ b is the probability of the bad state with low demand and λ g is the probability of 
the good state with high demand.  In  i iMPK MR , MRi stands for the marginal revenue 
product and MPKi stands for the marginal physical product of capital in state i.  The term 
c is the user cost of capital.  Those who suggest that TA96 has lowered ILEC investment 
make two arguments.  First, they claim that MRi equals the retail price of telecom output 
in state i  and that TA96 lowers retail prices, particularly in states of high demand.   
Second, they contend that TA96 makes the cost of capital c higher by increasing the risk 
of ILEC investment.  In both cases the level of capital and, thus, investment that satisfies 
the equation is smaller than would otherwise be the case.   
Our principal concern with these studies is that they treat ILECs as ordinary, 
price-taking competitive firms, rather than as natural monopolists, that control bottleneck 
infrastructure.  In taking this approach, the prior studies ignore the elementary textbook 
lesson that lowering and fixing the prices that monopolists can charge will induce them to 
produce more, not less, output.  The reason is that when confronted with a fixed price, 
monopolists no longer have an incentive to restrict production in order to jack up prices 
and profits.  Because producing more output entails acquiring more inputs, this means 
hiring more labor and investing in more capital.   
How does this discussion square with equation (1)?  It doesn’t.  In the case of a 
regulated monopoly, equation (1) doesn’t represent the correct framework for 
determining investment.  Even if it did, under monopoly marginal revenue, MRi, doesn’t   12
equal price, and eliminating monopoly by fixing a lower output price can actually raise 
marginal revenue.
19 
The third point seemingly missed by the prior studies is that TA96’s leased access 
provisions represent an indirect method of regulating the price telecom monopolists can 
charge.  Instead of simply setting and fixing price, leased access uses competition to do 
so.  In the course of setting a lower price, leased access expands the market, but also may 
transfer some market share to new entrants.  Total market output and capital must 
increase, but depending on the share captured by CLECs, ILEC capital may go up or 
down.  Leased access also transforms ILECs into wholesale producers with respect to 
their transactions with the CLECs.  And because much of the final output sold by CLECs 
employs wholesale network inputs purchased from the ILECs, the effect of retail market 
share loss on ILEC capital investments is likely to be minimal.  This point is important in 
assessing the unbundling simulations presented below.   
To summarize, TA96 needs to be understood as part of a general strategy of 
restraining a natural monopolist from exercising monopoly power.  The unbundling 
requirements of TA96 enforce competitive pricing.  While this lowers the prices the 
ILECs receive for their products, they are still likely to produce and invest more, either 
directly or through their sale of inputs to the CLECs, as they realize that limiting supply 
                                                           
19 When price is fixed (typically at average cost) via regulation, the monopolist ends up at a corner solution 
in which marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue with respect to a marginal increase in output and 
marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost with respect to decrease in output.  In the case of a monopolist, 
MRi does not simply equal the monopoly product price, Pi
m.  Instead, it equals the product Pi
m (1-1/ε), 
where ε is the elasticity of demand.  Unregulated monopolists operate in regions of the demand curve in 
which ε exceeds 1.  Consequently, marginal revenue is below price.  When regulators set a regulated lower 
price, call it Pi 
’, they also transform the demand curve facing the monopolist into a horizontal line, with ε = 
∞.  This, in turn, changes marginal revenue from the product Pi
m (1-1/ε) to Pi 
’.  Hence, leased access can 
raise ILEC marginal revenue even through it lowers the product price.    
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to increase prices will no longer work.  Thus, when one frames the discussion of TA96 as 
part of a policy to restrict monopoly power and compares the impact of TA96 with the 
price fixing and cutbacks in supply that its absence would foster, the conclusion that 
TA96 stimulates overall telecom output and investment seems unavoidable.  Moreover, 
the proposition, supported by the investment experience reported in Table 1, that it 
actually stimulates ILEC production and investment is highly plausible.   
An additional, but crucial point ignored by the literature claiming that TELRIC 
pricing is “too low,” is that that the TELRIC formula prices unbundled network access at 
its average cost rather than its much lower marginal cost.  Pricing at marginal cost is, of 
course, more efficient because it equates marginal benefits to marginal costs.  In contrast, 
TELRIC pricing may leave marginal benefits far above marginal costs.  Hence, under 
TELRIC pricing access rates may be set too high, rather than too low.  Indeed, TELRIC 
access rates appear to be far too high since the marginal costs of using many of the 
elements of the local network are close to zero. 
 
4.  Analyzing Telecom Investment as a Dynamic Game 
The ability of TA96 to restrain the ILECs from monopolizing the provision of 
telecom products depends critically on the degree to which the law encourages CLECs to 
enter and compete in local telecom markets.  In this section we develop an economic 
model that accounts for these factors.  Subsequent sections discuss the model’s 
calibration to U.S. county data and present our simulation results.  
A serious appraisal of TA96 and its impact on investment, product pricing, and 
consumer welfare requires a dynamic model that incorporates multiple telecom products,   14
entry and exit decisions, heterogeneity in local telecom demand, the first-mover 
advantage of the ILECs, the ability of multiple competitors to unbundle and use the local 
network pipeline, the cost of unbundling, competition from cable companies, the nature 
of local telecom competition at any point in time given current entrants, economies of 
scope in producing and marketing multiple telecom products in the same geographic 
location, and the option values of both waiting to invest and not waiting to invest.
20  Each 
of these features is included in our analysis.  One added feature that we include in our 
model but not in the simulations because of computational constraints is economies of 
scale in entering geographically adjacent markets.   
Since the model has a number of features, it may help to present it first 
informally, the task to which we now turn.  
 
Players, Products, and Location  
The model accommodates a variable number of players, products and local 
markets, which we reference as squares on a grid.  In the simulation, however, we posit 
four players – an ILEC, two CLECs and a Cable— that market two products – local voice 
and data – in 3108 local telecom markets – the counties in the continental United States.  
In principal, each player decides each period whether to remain in the squares in which 
                                                           
20 Hausman’s concern about option values affecting telecom investment decisions is certainly appropriate, 
but there is no way to evaluate TELRIC pricing without a fully articulated dynamic model in which the 
options available to both the ILECs and CLECs are made explicit.  Since Hausman fails to present such a 
model, he provides no substantiation for his allegation that TELRIC prices are set too low.  Furthermore, 
the TELRIC formula’s cost of capital takes into account investor considerations of option values.  Finally, 
many of the points that Hausman makes about CLECs having the option to terminate the purchase of UNE-
P service from ILECs are not particularly special to this market.  Regardless of what line of business one 
considers and regardless of whether one is talking about retail or wholesale sales, the reality is that retail 
telecom customers almost always retain the option of not buying one’s product leaving one with 
unrecoverable sunk costs.  Hausman’s concerns also seem to pre-date the FCC’s issuance of its Triennial 
Review Order in which is makes clear that it does not intend to require ILECs to provide CLECs access to 
services and capabilities that may arise from new ILEC investments or technologies.   15
she has been operating or whether to enter squares in which she hasn’t been operating.  
However, in our specific application of the model only the CLECs make entry and exit 
decisions.  
 
The Structure of Demand 
Demand differs in each square and can change over time.  Specifically, we 
assume that squares can differ in the number of consumers they contain and their average 
per capita income.  Households in these squares are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas 
preferences defined over communication services and other goods and services.   
Communication services are, themselves, a composite commodity generated by a Cobb-
Douglas production function, whose inputs are the individual telecommunication 
products sold on the market, e.g., voice and data.   
These assumptions greatly simplify the model and the time required for its 
computation.  With Cobb-Douglas preferences, households spend a fixed share of their 
incomes on communication services each period.  And, thanks to the Cobb-Douglas 
assumption about the production of communication services, households also spend a 
fixed share of their income each period on each particular telecom product.  This feature 
implies three things.  First, there is a unitary elasticity of demand for each telecom 
product.  Second, it becomes computationally simple to calculate total countywide 
demand for each telecom product once the price of the product is determined; all that is 
needed is to divide the price of the product by total countywide income.  Third, the 
demand for one telecom product does not depend on the prices of the other telecom 
products.     16
The Structure of Supply 
  Telecom firms are assumed to produce their products at constant marginal cost, 
but they face two different fixed costs.  One is a fixed cost for entering a square 
(geographic market), which must be paid upon initial entry, but need not be paid again as 
long as the firm continues to operate in the square.  Such fixed entry costs are meant to 
capture the costs of installing local infrastructure that is incidental to producing 
telecommunications services in the market in question.  
The other fixed cost is a flat operating cost that the firm must pay each period that 
it operates (produces and sells product) in the square.  One can think of these as the 
overhead costs of management, accounting, billing, providing customer support, 
advertising, maintaining a fringe benefits program, and the flat costs of renting (either 
explicitly or implicitly via direct ownership) necessary network facilities.   
  We can model economies of scale by specifying that the fixed entry and operating 
costs for a particular square are lower if the player is already operating in an adjacent 
square.  And we can model economies of scope by assuming that if a player offers more 
than one product in a square, her fixed costs of entering the square to offer the second 
product and her fixed operating costs with respect to this second product are lower. 
 
The State of Entry 
At the beginning of each period, there is a state of entry that indicates which 
players operated in the square in the previous period.  The indicator variables identifying 
such states of entry represent the model’s state variables.  The state space that is relevant 
to entry decisions in any given square can get very large in the presence of economies of   17
scale.  The reason is that the state of entry in one square can affect entry and exit 
decisions in adjacent squares, which, in turn, affect decisions in squares adjacent to the 
original adjacent squares, and so on.  This implies that the inclusion of scale economies 
enlarges the state space relevant to entry and exit in a given square to the state of entry in 
all squares.  Since the application of our model treats each of the 3108 counties in the 
continental United States as a square, incorporating economies of scale would entail 
evaluating an enormous set of strategies over an enormous set of state variables – 
something far beyond the capacity of conventional computers.  
 
Entry and Exit Decisions 
At the beginning of each period, the players decide whether or not to offer each of 
the products in each of the squares.  The fixed costs they incur for entering a square and 
offering service may differ across products and, as indicated, be subject to economies of 
both scale and scope.  The fixed operating costs can also be subject to economies of 
scope, if more than one product is offered by the same player in a given square.  The fact 
that incumbents don’t need to pay an entry cost, while new entrants do, captures the 
advantage of moving first (being an incumbent).  In general, entry costs will differ across 
players and are influenced by regulatory policy.  
Players that exit a market are assumed to abandon their infrastructure.  Hence, if 
they choose at a future date to enter a square, they will need to repay the fixed entry cost.  
This feature may lead players to remain in a square in the short run even if they are losing 
money on current operations.   18
Since there are several products per square and many squares, there are many 
different “in” or “out” entry strategies over which each player must choose.  This choice 
is whittled down by solving for the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria, which, in this 
setting, refers to the set of strategies in which each player makes an entry decision with 
respect to each product and each square that generates the largest expected profits, 
measured in present value, given the entry decisions (i.e., the strategy sets) of the other 
players.  Players consider not just their current profits from entry, but also their future 




In entry games of this type, multiple Nash equilibria are to be expected. 
Intuitively, if player A enters a market it may be optimal for player B to stay out.  But if 
player A stays out, it may be optimal for player B to go in.  Which outcome arises can be 
thought of as a fluke of timing since there is nothing in our model that pins down which 
equilibrium is selected.   
Our method of resolving the problem of multiple Nash equilibria in a given period 
is to assume that each of the Nash equilibria is played with the same probability.
21  The 
players realize that this randomly determined coordination over particular Nash equilibria 
will occur not only in the present, but also at every future date.  And they take this into 
account in determining their best current entry/exit strategy for each of the possible 
current entry/exit strategies of their fellow players.   
                                                           
21 This assumption that a particular equilibrium among the many available is selected is Aumann’s (1974) 
correlated equilibrium.     19
Within-Period Product Competition 
Once entry and exit decisions have been made, the players operating in a given 
square play Cournot.  Consequently, the more entrants in a given square, the lower are 
product prices, and the better off are consumers.
22  Another appealing feature of Cournot 
within-period equilibria is that producers with lower marginal costs produce more output 
than those with higher marginal costs.  Finally, the Cournot Model suggests that the 
reduction in product prices associated with more competition can lead the ILEC to invest 
more and produce more output.  While the Cournot model has lots of appealing features, 
the list does not include the ability to consider the bundling of products that players 
would likely use to achieve a competitive advantage.  Such product bundling will be 
examined in future work.  
 
Option Valuation 
The model is solved using dynamic programming, which automatically captures 
all the options available to the players with respect either to delaying or accelerating their 
entry/investment decisions.
23  Consequently, it deals explicitly with the concerns raised 
by Hausman (1998, 2002) that TA96’s effects must be evaluated with respect to possible 
ILEC options to wait to invest.  Although our model does not include exogenous pricing 
uncertainty, future prices are uncertain because of the correlation on randomly selected 
equilibria.  Hence, there can be a value to waiting in order to ascertain whether other 
firms choose to enter a square. 
 
                                                           
22 This assumes that new entrants do not have higher marginal costs, on average, than incumbents.   
23 If the last period is set sufficiently far into the future, its choice will not affect the model’s predicted 
current behavior.    20
The Formal Model 
  Time runs from t=1 to t=T.  There are Z players, V network inputs, and F= H ×  M 
squares, where H is the number of north-south squares and M is the number of east-west 
squares.  For each product and for each player, there are N=2
F possible states of entry at 
the beginning of any period, where a state of entry is a description of all the squares in 
which a player was operating in the previous period.  
 
Entry Space 
The possible states of entry of player i with respect to product k at the beginning 
of any time t are given by the N rows of the N ×  F matrix E, with row vector ei.  A value 
of 0 indicates entry has not yet occurred.  A value of 1 indicates entry has occurred.  Note 
that there are F elements in each row vector – one for each square.  
(1) 
e1  =  (0,0,0,0,…,0) 
e2  = (1,0,0,0, …,0) 
e3  =  (0,1,0,0,…,0) 
e4  =  (1,1,0,0,…,0) 
e5  =  (0,0,1,0,…,0) 
e6  = (1,0,1,0, …,0) 
e7  = (0,1,1,0, …,0) 
e8  = (1,1,1,0, …,0) 
.                . 
.                . 
.                . 
eN  = (1,1,1, …,1) 
 
 
The State of Entry 
 
Let mikt denote the entry state of player i with respect to product k at the beginning 
of time t.  The value of mikt is a number ranging from 1 through N indicating which of the   21
N row vectors of E is applicable.  The entry state of all players at the beginning of time t 
is given by the Z ×  V matrix At, whose row vectors (one for each player) are given below.   
(2)  a1t  =  (m11t , m12t, …, m1Vt) 
a2t  =  (m21t , m22t, …, m2Vt) 
.                       . 
.                       . 
.                       . 
aZt  =  (mZ1t , mZ2t, …, mZVt) 
 
Each element in At can take on N different values.  Hence, there are N
ZV different possible 
states of nature (At matrices) at time t.  
Strategies 
In each period, each player can play any of the rows of E; i.e., players can stay 
where they are in terms of entry, chose to leave squares they entered in the past, or 
choose to enter squares in which they were not operating in the previous period.  There 
are  G = N
V  different strategies for each player, because there are V products and N 
possible entry vectors for each product.  Index these strategies by g, where g = 1,…,G.  
Let sg(i)t refers to strategy g undertaken by player i at time t, where strategy vector sg(i)t = 
(jg(i)1t , jg(i)2t , …,jg(i)Vt ), for g(i)= 1,…,G.  This vector indicates the entry decisions made 
by player i at time t for each product given that player i is playing strategy g(i).  For 
example, suppose there are three products (V = 3) and consider sg(i)t = (4,7,2).  This 
strategy entails player i entering the market for product 1 in all the squares determined by 
the row vector e4, entering the market for product 2 in all the squares determined by the 
row vector e7, and entering the market for product 3 in all the squares determined by the 
row vector e2.  
   22
Determination of Entry at Time T  
Entry decisions at time T need to be made for each possible state of the entry 
matrix AT.   For each such possible state we calculate all pure strategy equilibria at time T.  
We then assume that each of these equilibria arises at time T with equal probability; i.e., 
that there is a random correlation mechanism that chooses the equilibrium.  
 
Calculating Pure Strategy Equilibria at Time T 
Let π it (sg(1)1t, sg(2)2t,…, sg(Z)Zt; At ) for g(1) = 1,…,G; g(2) = 1,…,G; …; g(Z) = 
1,…,G; specify the net income earned by firm i in period t given the state of entry is At 
from playing strategy sgit given that player 1 plays sg(1)1t, player 2 plays sg(2)2t, etc.   For  
(sg(1)1T, sg(2)2T,…, sg(i)iT, …, sg(Z)ZT; AT ) to be a pure strategy at T, it must be the case that,  
(3) 
π 1T (sg(1)T, sg(2)T,…, sg(Z)T; AT ) ≥  π 1T (sjT, sg(2)T,…, sg(Z)T; AT ), for all j ≠  g(1). 
 
π 2T (sg(1)T, sg(2)T,…, sg(Z)T; AT ) ≥  π 2T (sg(1)T, sjT,…, sg(Z)T; AT ), for all j ≠  g(2). 
 
 .       .  
 .       .  
 .       .  
π ZT (sg(1)T, sg(2)T,…, sg(Z)T; AT ) ≥  π ZT (sg(1)T, sg(2)T,…, sjT; AT ), for all j ≠  g(Z). 
 
 
Determination of Entry at t<T 
Entry decisions at time t need to be made for each possible state-of-entry matrix 
At.  For each possible state-of-entry matrix we calculate all the economy’s pure strategy 
equilibria at time t.  As in the case of entry at time T, we assume that each of the time t<T 
equilibria arise with equal probability.  
   23
Calculating Pure Strategy Equilibria at Time t 
Let Nt(At) equal the number of pure strategy equilibria at time t given that the 
entry state at time t is At.  Let nt = 1,…,Nt(At) reference these equilibria.  Define Vit(At) as 
the expected present value of net income earned by firm i calculated at the beginning of 
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where ViT+1(AT+1) = 0.  The term δ is the discount factor.  The index nt, which references 
the pure strategy equilibrium played at time t, determines the entry state that will prevail 
at time t+1.  Hence, At+1 is written as a function of nt.  For  (sg(1)t, sg(2)t,…, sg(i)t, …, sg(Z)t; 
At ) to be a pure strategy at t, it must satisfy  
(5) 
π 1t (sg(1)t, sg(2)t,…, sg(Z)t; At )+ δV1t+1(At+1(sg(1)1t, sg(2)2t,…, sg(Z)Zt))  ≥   
 
π 1t (sj1t, sg(2)2t,…, sg(Z)Zt; At ) + δV1t+1(At+1(sj1t, sg(2)2t,…, sg(Z)Zt)),       for all j ≠  g(1). 
 
 
π 1t (sg(1)1t, sg(2)2t,…, sg(Z)Zt; At )+ δV1t+1(At+1(sg(1)t, sg(2)t,…, sg(Z)t))  ≥   
 
π 1t (sjt, sg(2)t,…, sg(Z)t; At ) + δV1t+1(At+1(sjt, sg(2)t,…, sg(Z)t)),       for all j ≠  g(2). 
  .       .  
 .       .  
.       .  
π 1t (sg(1)t, sg(2)t,…, sg(Z)t; At )+ δV1t+1(At+1(sg(1)t, sg(2)t,…, sg(Z)t))  ≥   
 
π 1t (sg(1)t, sg(2)t,…, sg(Z)t; At ) + δV1t+1(At+1(sg(1)t, sg(2)t,…, sjt)),       for all j ≠  g(Z). 
 
The equations defining pure strategy equilibria are the same as those for time T except 
that the players consider not simply current net revenue from playing a particular 
strategy, but also the expected present value of future revenue associated with entering   24
the next period from the entry state to which their own strategic entry decisions as well as 
those of their competitors lead.   
 
The Structure of Demand and Supply 
 
Assume the utility of agents is Cobb-Douglas in communications, c, and other 
goods, d, where  




Each agent’s demand for communications is given by c = αy/pc, where y stands for 
income and pc stands for the price of communications. Each agent produces 
communications based on a Cobb-Douglas production function that takes as inputs the V 
communications products that include local telephone and data.  Each agent’s production 
function is given by 
                                                                   j=V 
(8)    c = Hq1 
β 1 q2 
β 2 … qV 
β V , where β V = 1 - Σ  β j  
                                                                  
 j=1 
Cost minimization implies that input expenditure shares equal their production 
coefficients.   
(9)   piqi = β i E 
 
The constant returns property means that total costs equal total expenditures.  Hence, 
(10)    pcc = E  ,  
where pi is the price (user cost) of input i.  And since pcc = αy, we have 
 




(12)   qi =β iαy/pi   25
 
The aggregate demand for telecom input i in the telecom market in question, Qi , is then,  
(13)        Qi =β iαY/pi ,  
where Y  is aggregate income in the local telecom market. 
 
The Cournot Game   
A player j producing telecom input i playing Cournot will set  
(14)   ηθ ji =(pi – mcji)/pi ,  
where η  is the inverse demand elasticity in the market for the input, θ ji is the output share 
of player j in the production of good i,  and  mcji is the marginal cost of player j in 
producing input i.  In this model, η  = 1.  Summing the above equation over all players j, 
we have that  
                  vi 
(15)   pi = Σ   mcij / (vi – 1),  
        
          j=1             
 




Summarizing and Evaluating the Solution 
This solution is simple.  In each square for each configuration of entrants being 
considered, we simply add up the marginal costs of the players, divide by one less than 
their number, and that’s the price that will prevail.  The formula, Qi =β iαY/pi can be used 
to determine Qi, and each entrant j’s output can be determined by multiplying qj=θ jQi, 
where θ j=(pi – mcji)/pi.  Player j’s profit for operating in the square for the period in 
question is given by piqj –fecj – focj – mcjqj, where fecj refers to the fixed cost of entry for   26
player  j if she hasn’t already entered the market and focj  stands for player j’s  fixed 
operating cost.  
A shortcoming of this method of modeling demand is that the solution is not well 
defined in the case of a monopolist because the demand elasticity for each telecom input 
equals unity.  We assume that when there is a single player supplying an input in a given 
market, the player is forced by regulators to price at levels that roughly match current 
actual circumstances.   
The model’s solution has the property that a player’s profits in producing one 
telecom input don’t depend on the amount of the other telecom inputs she supplies in the 
market (square).  The reason is that the demand curve for input i depends only on its own 
price and not on the prices of the other inputs.  Were this not the case, a Cournot player in 
a square supplying more than one input would have to consider how her supply of one 
input altered the price and thus demand for the other input(s) she supplies.   
 
5.  Calibration 
To focus the model on the current policy debate, we assume that in each county 
there are two markets, local voice and data, and that the ILEC offers both of these 
services in each county in the initial period.  We also assume that cable companies have 
entered some, but not all counties, to offer CATV service – and if they are offering 
CATV service in a county, they also offer data in that county.  Because of franchise 
limitations, cable companies are assumed never to enter additional counties, nor to exit 
counties.  Our procedure for specifying which counties are served by cable companies is 
to use FCC statistics that report the percentage of zip codes in each state having particular   27
numbers of broadband providers.
24  We assume these statewide percentages of zip codes 
apply similarly to the counties in a state and thus infer the percentage of counties in each 
state having two or more broadband providers.  This percentage is then assumed to be the 
percentage of counties served by a cable provider.  Next, we rank the counties in each 
state by population density and, starting with the county with the highest density, we 
work down the ranking until we have selected enough counties to account for the 
specified percentage of counties with a cable provider.  Thus, for Alaska, the FCC report 
indicates that 22 percent of the Alaska’s zip codes have two or more broadband 
providers.  We then assume that the 22 percent of Alaska's counties with the highest 
population density have a cable provider.   
In addition to the ILEC and cable company providers of voice or data services in 
a square, we assume that there are two identical CLECs, which decide individually 
whether to enter one or both of these product markets in each particular square. 
When the ILEC is the sole provider of voice in a particular county, we assume, to 
repeat, that the price for voice is set via regulation.  We refer to this regulated price as the 
regulated monopoly price.  The same assumption is made with respect to the price of data 
in counties in which the ILEC is the sole provider of data.  However, if one or more 
competitors enter a county in either voice or data or both, we assume that prices are set 
according to Cournot competition. 
Interestingly, there is no guarantee that Cournot competition will generate lower 
prices than those currently set by regulators.  The prices that emerge in a county with one 
or more competitors will depend on the precise number of competitors and their marginal 
                                                           
24 “FCC Releases  Data on High-Speed Services for Internet Access,”  FCC Press Release, July 10, 2003.  
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0603.pdf. 
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costs of production.  Since the marginal costs facing CLECs depend on the UNE rates set 
by state PUCs, PUCs should be aware that if they set their UNE rates too high, they may 
be leaving consumers facing higher telecom prices under “competition” than under 
regulated monopoly.  This, in fact, is what we find in a minority of counties in states with 
particularly high UNE rates. 
We assume that preferences of residential consumers for communication services 
are identical across all counties.  However, total residential consumer demand in each 
county will differ based on the county’s number of households and average level of 
household income.  Our county counts of total households and our county averages of 
household income come from the 2000 U.S. Census (available at 
http://www.factfinder.census.gov). 
Households are assumed to spend three percent of their income on 
communication services.  This percentage accords with findings from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey and is used to identify the model’s Cobb-Douglas preference 
parameter.  Of the total expenditure on communication services, we assume that 70 
percent is spent on local voice and 30 percent is spent on data.
25  
Another component of demand for communication services in each county is 
business demand, which we assume is inelastic.  Hence, in each county we add a fixed 
level of expenditure by businesses on voice and data services to the respective household 
demands for those services.  We determine these fixed expenditures in the following 
manner.  The PACE Report details total business lines per state,
26 and a 2002 Commerce 
                                                           
25 “Consumer Telecom Spending Increases by 6% from Previous Year,” TNS Telecoms Report, July 15, 
2003, posted at http://www.tnstelecoms.com/press-7-15-03.html.  
26 The “UNE-P Fact Report: January 2003" by the PACE Coalition is available at 
http://www.pacecoalition.org/UNEPfactreport_1_2003/   29
Capital Markets report provides estimates of business revenues per line per ILEC 
provider.
27  We multiply each state’s total business lines by the state’s ILEC’s business 
revenue per line to arrive at our estimate of total voice business expenditures by state.  
We allocate this overall state expenditure across the counties in the state based on the 
cross-county distribution of total state employment, where our county employment data 
are taken from the 2000 U.S. Census.
28    
We follow the same county-allocation procedure with respect to our estimate of 
total business spending on broadband in each state.  This estimate is determined by 
multiplying our estimate of each state’s total business voice expenditure by the nation-
wide ratio of total business broadband spending to total business voice spending.  Our 
estimate of total business broadband spending comes from data reported in an ISP-Planet 
article posted at http://www.isp-planet.com/research/2002/cable_020524.html.  This 
article indicates that small businesses are spending about $2.3 billion in 2002 on 
broadband and that they account for 34 percent of the total business broadband market.  
Dividing $2.3 billion by .34 gives $6.8 billion, which is our estimate of total business 
broadband spending in 2002.  Our measure of total business voice spending is determined 
by simply adding together our state estimates of business voice spending.  
 
                                                           
27 See Exhibit 6 in Anna Maria Kovacs, Kristin L. Burns, and Gregory S. Vitale, “The Status of 271 and 
UNE-Platform in the Regional Bells’ Territories,” Commerce Capital Markets, Inc. November 8, 2002.  
Although this report’s authors note numerous weaknesses in the development of this business revenues 
number and suspect that their estimates are much too high, we are not aware of a superior public estimate 
for this figure. 
28 We received these data via a special request made to the U.S. Census Department.    30
Incorporating Current Policy 
To accommodate current policy, we expanded our model to allow CLECs to 
decide each period whether or not to operate in a county under UNEs.  Recall that to offer 
voice, CLECs purchase a platform of local network elements from ILECs at wholesale 
rates and add to it their own marketing and customer support to create retail voice 
services to sell to the public.  This does not require CLECs to collocate in ILEC central 
offices in order to access physically the local phone line (loop).   Such collocation and 
physical connection to the customer’s loop is, however, required for the CLEC to be able 
to offer broadband.   
When a CLEC decides to offer data, it has the option of offering voice as well.  
Because CLECs are more than willing to provide both data and voice services over the 
loops they access from the ILEC, we assume that when offering data, CLECs need pay 
only a single entry fee and a single fixed annual operating fee to enter a county and be 
able to provide both voice and data; i.e., we assume strong economies of scope in 
providing both products.  The result is that CLECs that enter a local market to offer data 
also choose to provide voice.  But given the prohibitive operational and cost impediments 
enumerated above in backhauling voice signals from a collocation into the CLEC’s own 
network, we assume, realistically, that such CLECs return the voice signal to the ILEC 
switch from this collocation point and offer voice under UNE-P.  As discussed in the 
calibration section, we add an additional marginal cost to account for data-providing 
CLECs’ extra costs to offering voice.   31
All players (ILEC and CLECs) must cover their fixed operating costs in each 
period they are present in a square -- regardless of whether they are offering just voice, or 
voice and data.  
 
Additional Parameters 
We assume that the regulated monopoly price for voice in each state is set at the 
average residential revenue per line per state, which, across all states, averages roughly 
$29.
29  We set the regulated monopoly price for data at $50 based on our sense of the 
average broadband price that would prevail around the country in the absence of any 
competition.  We set the ILEC’s marginal cost of providing voice at $5.  Note that this is 
the ILEC’s short-run marginal network costs for providing an extra voice line of service.  
We treat the ILEC’s ongoing marketing, customer support, and sales costs in a given 
county as fixed operating costs that total $50 per household times the number of 
households in the county.  
Our source for each state’s actual UNE-P rates is the above-referenced 2002 Ex 
Parte submission.  Our source for state-specific TELRIC UNE-P rates are the TELRIC 
rates calculated from the UNE version of the FCC’s 1998 Synthesis Model, with a 5 
percent annual adjustment to reflect intervening reductions in input prices and unit costs.   
State-specific actual and TELRIC UNE-P rates are reported in Table 2.  Consider 
first current UNE-P rates, and note the wide range in values, from a low of $12.42 in 
Indiana to a high of $45.64 in West Virginia.  About three-fifths of the states are setting 
                                                           
29 See Ex Parte submission from Joan Marsh, AT&T, to Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 01-338, 
September 25, 2002.  These data were collected at a time when there was relatively little voice competition 
in the country.   32
UNE-P rates from $18 to $25.  Only 7 states have UNE-P rates that are reasonably close 
to the national weighted average TELRIC rate of $15.10.   
Next consider the true TELRIC UNE-P rates.  These range in value from a low of 
$9.45 in Washington, D.C. to a high of $27.39 in Missouri.  Thirty-eight states, including 
the District of Columbia, have true TELRIC rates below $18.  In only 5 states do 
TELRIC rates exceed $22.  While TELRIC UNE-P prices are, on average, 27.9 percent 
lower than current UNE prices, five states – Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, and 
Vermont have set current UNE-P rates below the TELRIC levels, with the difference 
reaching as high as $1.74 in Indiana.   On the other hand, current UNE-P prices exceed 
their corresponding TELRIC levels by $6 or more in 34 states, including Washington, 
D.C.  The largest differential -- $21.75 -- arises in the case of West Virginia, where the 
current UNE –P rate is $45.64 even though the true TELRIC UNE-P rate is only $23.89.  
CLECs that provide voice-only services using UNEs are assumed to face a 
marginal cost equal to the UNE-P (whether actual or TELRIC) rate plus $5 to cover 
customer support costs.  Such CLECs incur no fixed entry cost, but do need to pay fixed 
operating costs on an ongoing basis for marketing, sales, and customer support, which we 
also take as $50 per household times the number of households.  CLECs that operate in a 
given county (square) to provide data and voice are assumed to face a marginal cost for 
offering voice equal to the prevailing UNE-P rate plus $5 for customer support costs plus 
$5 for additional costs of interfacing with the ILECs to hand back the voice portion of the 
signal.  The marginal cost of providing data is set at $20 for both the local ILEC and 
cable companies and at $25 for CLECs, where the difference reflects the higher CLEC 
costs for acquiring and transporting the data signal to their network.     33
The fixed cost faced by a CLEC to enter a county and operate under UNE-L is set 
at $75 times the number of households in the county.  And the CLEC’s fixed operating 
cost each year under UNE-P is, again, set at $50 times the number of households in the 
county.  Note that CLECs that enter under UNE-L and UNE-P to market both voice and 
data incur only a single fixed entry cost and need pay only a single annual fixed operating 
cost.  
The final parameter we need to discuss is the choice of discount rate applicable to 
CLEC decision-making.  We use an 11 percent real discount rate.  This seems, if 
anything, to be on the low side, given the considerable risks of new carriers entering and 
competing in the telecom market with its ever-changing policies and policymakers.  Were 
we to use a higher discount rate, our model would likely generate less data entry than we 
report.  The reason is that for CLECs to enter providing data, they need to recoup their 
fixed entry costs.  But the higher the discount rate, the smaller will be the present value of 
the future profits from entry that need to be set against the immediate cost of entry.  
 
6.  Findings 
  We now present two sets of findings, one from running the model based on the 
actually prevailing UNE rates and the other based on running the model assuming each 
state adopts completely TELRIC UNE rates.  To limit the paper’s length, we show only 
aggregate results in most tables.  However, we discuss some of the state-specific results 
in the text.  The state-specific results for all tables are posted at 
http://econ.bu.edu/kotlikoff. 
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The Effect of UNE-P Rates on Voice and Data Prices 
  Table 3 shows the impact on voice and data prices of introducing UNE-P 
competition under both actual and TELRIC rates.  The top set of results is for the entire 
country.  The next set of results divides counties into four groups based on whether their 
levels of per capita income are higher or lower than average, and whether their 
population density is higher or lower than average.  HYHD stands for high income, high 
density.  HYLD stands for high income, low density.  LYHD stands for low income, high 
density.  And LYLD stands for low income, low density.  
 
Average Voice Prices Across the Country
30 
Table 3’s results compare our measure of the regulated monopoly price with the 
prices that prevail under the two UNE pricing regimes.  Each of the regulated monopoly 
prices reported in the table represents a household weighted average of the counties 
included in average.  Our association of regulated monopoly prices for voice with the 
average state voice prices that prevailed in 2000 is admittedly arbitrary since these 
figures come from a period marked by some, albeit very limited, competition.  In any 
case, these state averages range from $28 to $31 per line per month, with the national 
average voice price equaling $28.93.  In the case of data, we’ve assumed, to repeat, a 
regulated monopoly price of $50 per month per broadband connection.  Since the model’s 
terminal date of year 20 is set to limit computation time and is, in that sense, arbitrary, we 
focus here on prices and entry that arise in the initial year following the introduction of 
either actual or TELRIC UNE-P rates.  
                                                           
30 All of the calculated figures in this paper should be only taken as suggestive of the model’s results based 
on a uniform nationwide parameterization.  We have not attempted to capture all of the influences 
surrounding these competitive interactions.   35
First consider UNE-P competition based on the actual UNE rates now being set 
by state PUCs.  According to our model, this policy actually raises the nationwide 
average voice price by $1.68 relative to the regulated monopoly price.
31  This reflects the 
point we made above that if UNE rates are set too high, they will deliver prices that are 
higher than those arising under regulated monopoly.   
Next consider the impact of switching from current to TELRIC UNE-P rates.  
This lowers the nation’s average voice price by 15.5 percent from $30.61 to $25.86.  
Note that the average voice price is now lower than the regulated monopoly price, by 
10.6 percent.  
  Table 3’s next set of results, which break out prices based on county income and 
density, show that counties of all income and density levels stand to gain from switching 
from current to TELRIC UNE pricing.  The largest gains arise in counties with the 
highest densities and highest levels of per capital income.  In counties with high per 
capita income and high density, the potential gain is 22.6 percent.  For counties with low 
density and low income per capita, the potential gain is 8.7 percent.  
 
Voice Prices in Individual States 
  Under current UNE rates, voice prices range from a low of $23.09 in Illinois to a 
high of $42.21 in South Dakota.  These differences partly reflect the relative sizes of the 
markets in the particular counties in the two states, but they are primarily the 
                                                           
31 Recall that this assumes no retail rate regulation.  The model’s predicted increase over time in the 
average voice price reflects the 20-year length of the model.  As this terminal date for competition and 
entry approaches, CLECs become more willing to enter both voice and data as opposed to just voice 
because they know that in the future there will be less entry given that competitors will have less time to 
recoup their fixed entry costs.  As indicated above, the marginal costs that CLECs face for voice given that 
they are offering data are assumed to be $5 higher than under just voice, which explains the higher 
equilibrium prices generated in the Cournot quantity setting game.   36
consequence of the UNE rates set by those states.  As indicated in table 2, the Illinois 
current UNE rate is $12.69, while South Dakota’s is $34.82.  Only three states -- 
California, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan – have voice prices that fall below $25 per line 
when current UNE rates are run through the model.
32  At the other extreme, three states -- 
Idaho, South Dakota, and Wyoming – have current UNE prices above $38.  By way of 
comparison, voice prices under a TELRIC UNE rate regime range between $21.52 in 
Illinois and $36.78 in Wyoming.   
According to the model, some states would experience particularly large voice 
price reductions in moving from current to TELRIC UNE rates.  In Massachusetts, for 
example, the price reduction is 39.9 percent.  In South Dakota, the reduction is 25.9 
percent.  And in the state of Washington, it’s 27.8 percent.   
 
Data Prices 
Turning to data prices, note that regardless of whether UNE-P is priced at actual 
or TELRIC rates, there is sufficient CLEC entry to substantially lower broadband prices. 
In the case of current UNE pricing, the resulting data price is $37.41, which is 25.2 
percent below the regulated monopoly price.  In the case of TELRIC UNE-P pricing, the 
data price is slightly higher -- $38.56, but this is still 22.9 percent below the regulated 
monopoly price.  In contrast to UNE voice pricing, there are much larger differences in 
data pricing across regions that are distinguished by per capita income and density.   
Interestingly, low density-low income counties experience particularly low data 
prices under TELRIC UNE rates -- $37.85 per month compared with $39.43 per month in 
                                                           
32 The Indiana PUC has recently raised its UNE rates significantly.  See 
http://www.in.gov/iurc/press/2004/42393_010504.pdf    37
the high density-high income counties.  The explanation here appears to lie in the fact 
that cable companies aren’t competing in the low-density counties.  Consequently, there 
is sufficient profit opportunity for two CLECs to enter a number of such counties, which 
lowers the data price by a greater percentage.   
There is a significant spread across states in data prices.  For example, under the 
policy of current UNE rates, data prices range from $33.04 in Kansas to $41.85 in West 
Virginia.  
 
Consumer and Business Voice Savings from Implementing TELRIC UNE-P Rates 
  Table 4 shows for each state and all states combined the annual local voice 
savings accruing to consumers and businesses associated with switching from current to 
TELRIC UNE rates.  The table assumes that states with UNE rates below our TELRIC 
proxy will not adjust upward their UNE rates. 
Totaled across all the states, the annual savings is just shy of $15 billion.  That’s a 
lot of money.  Indeed, it exceeds the gross domestic product of most countries.  Those 
states whose UNE rates are the farthest from TELRIC levels and have the largest markets 
obviously have the most to gain from lowering their rates.  Texas, New York, and 
Massachusetts stand to gain $1.9 billion, $1.8 billion, and $1.1 billion, respectively.   But 
smaller, less populated, and less wealthy states, like Oklahoma, also could do very well 
by changing their UNE pricing policy.  Oklahoma’s potential gain is $129 million.   
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The Nature of Entry 
Table 5 examines the structure of competition in the voice market and, thus, the 
entry that arises, under actual and TELRIC UNE-P regimes.
33  The results clearly 
indicate that there is significantly more entry and competition under TELRIC pricing.   In 
the case of current UNE rates, 36.2 percent of households end up where they started – 
living in counties with no competition and being forced to purchase voice services from 
the ILEC.  The introduction of TELRIC pricing cuts the percentage of households 
without choice almost in half.  Now, only 19.3 percent of households live in non-
competitive counties.   Furthermore, in the actual UNE rate regime, only 11.6 percent of 
households live in counties that experience entry by two CLECs, whereas this figure rises 
to 17.6 percent when TELRIC rates are substituted. 
As one would expect, entry and competition is most pronounced in the high 
income/high-density counties.  In the case of TELRIC pricing, 99.0 percent of all 
households in such counties experience entry by at least one CLEC, and 29.1 percent 
experience entry by two CLECs.
34   
On the other hand, because the rich, dense markets already enjoy some 
competition under current UNE-P rates, movement to TELRIC pricing is relatively more 
important for low-income, low-density counties in generating competition.  Indeed, 
                                                           
33 There are a couple of counties in which ILECs stop providing service in the short run.  That’s why the 
row percentages in Table 4 may not always sum to 100 percent.   
34 The dynamics of entry shown in Table 5 are also quite interesting.  There is much more entry in the 
medium and long runs than in the short run.  This additional entry occurs lonly when the CLEC offers data 
in addition to voice.  The reason is that the CLECs realize that early entry, while it offers a longer period to 
recoup the fixed cost of entering for data, is also riskier because the likelihood that competitors will enter in 
the future is higher.  This likelihood of future entry declines the closer the players get to the model’s 20-
year end date as potential competitors realize that there is too little time to recoup their investments.  Stated 
differently, the barrier to entry represented by the fixed entry cost is a greater obstacle to entry when this 
cost much be amortized over only a few years.  
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TELRIC pricing raises the fraction of households in such counties that can enjoy the 
fruits of competition from 44.3 percent to 62.2 percent.  
For individual states, the structure of competition can differ dramatically, 
particularly with current UNE rates.  At one extreme is Arizona in which there is 
essentially no entry under current UNE rates.
35  At the other extreme are California, 
Michigan, and Washington D.C., in which essentially all households experience 
competition.  With TELRIC UNE pricing, the share of Arizona residents that enjoy a 
choice in providers rises from less than 1 percent to 83.6 percent. 
  Table 6 provides further information about the nature of entry.  It shows the type 
of CLEC entry under both current and TELRIC UNE-P rates.  In the table “Voice Only” 
stands for only one CLEC entering under for voice.  “Combined” stands for one CLEC 
entering for both voice and data.  “Combined/Voice” stands for two CLECs, one of 
which enters for both voice and data and the other of which enters just for voice.   
“Voice/Voice” stands for two CLECs, both of which enter just for voice.   
“Combined/Combined” stands for two CLECs, both of which enter for both voice and 
data.  And “No CLECs” refers to counties with no CLEC entry. 
  The table shows that pricing UNEs at TELRIC rather than actual rates increases 
overall CLEC entry, particularly for voice.  With TELRIC UNE pricing, over two-fifths 
of households live in counties with one CLEC that offers voice.  But almost one half of 
households live in counties in which one or more CLECs offer both voice and data.  
Interestingly, the model generates no cases in which two CLECs enter just to provide 
voice.  
                                                           
35 Since this paper was developed, the Arizona PUC has reduced its UNE rates, and entry may be 
occurring.   40
The table also indicates more entry by CLECs into data markets in low-density-
low-income counties due to the absence of competition from cable companies.  This 
explains why the move to TELRIC pricing ends up lowering data prices by more in low-
density-low-income counties than in high-density-high-income ones.  
 
CLEC Shares in Voice and Data Markets 
  Tables 7 and 8 show the CLEC shares of the voice and data markets, respectively.  
According to the model, with current UNE rates, CLECs have 10.7 percent of the voice 
market and 13.1 percent of the data market.   The respective voice and data market shares 
reported by the FCC in mid 2003 are 14.7 percent and 6.6 percent.
36  So our model, while 
in the same ballpark with respect to the actual and predicted levels of these shares, does 
not fit the data perfectly.  
According to the model, the move to true TELRIC pricing raises our model’s 
CLEC voice market share from 10.7 percent to 16.5 percent.  On the other hand, it lowers 
the CLEC data market share from 13.1 percent to 12.1 percent.  The CLEC voice share 
depends significantly on the type of county being considered.  In the case of high-income 
- high-density counties, the model predicts a 14.8 percent CLEC share with current UNE-
P rates and a 21.6 percent share with TELRIC UNE-P rates.  For low-income – low 
density counties, the CLEC voice share is 6.7 percent under current UNE-P rates and 
13.2 percent under TELRIC rates.  Hence, in low-income – low-density counties 
competition is relatively more sensitive to the level of UNE-P rates.  
 
                                                           
36 http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-242397A1.pdf and 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-242398A1.pdf   41
The Distribution of Price Changes Across Households 
  Table 9 shows the share of households experiencing particular voice-price 
changes relative to the regulated monopoly price under the current UNE-P regime.  In the 
current UNE-P regime, almost two fifths of households end up facing a higher voice 
price than the regulated monopoly price.  Indeed, over a quarter of the households 
experience price increases in excess of 20 percent.  For the roughly three fifths of 
households who see their prices fall, the declines are generally modest.  Fewer than 6 
percent of all households experience voice price reductions greater than 20 percent.   
These nation-wide results mask, however, major differences across states in the treatment 
of households.  In some states, like Louisiana, all households experience price hikes, 
while in other states, like Illinois, all households experience price cuts.   
As Table 10 shows, this heterogeneity is much less pronounced in the case of 
TELRIC UNE-P rates.  In this case, almost all households experience price reductions in 
voice relative to the regulated monopoly price.  To be precise, more than a quarter of 
households experience price reductions in excess of 20 percent, and almost three fifths of 
households enjoy voice price cuts of 10 percent or more.  As in the case of current UNE-
P rates, households in different states have quite different experiences.  In New York, 
almost four-fifths of households enjoy a 30 to 40 percent reduction in voice prices, 
whereas in Arkansas almost two thirds of households experience a modest price increase 
compared to the regulated monopoly price.  
Table 11 shows the distribution of price changes from implementing TELRIC 
rather than current UNE-P rates.  Almost two-fifths of households see their voice bills 
fall by at least 20 percent, and over one fifth experience a 30 percent or greater reduction   42
in these bills.  In certain states, the price reductions are really big.  In Massachusetts and 
Maryland, for example, over three-fifths of households experience voice price reductions 
ranging from 40 to 50 percent.   
 
Changes in Investment and Hiring Outlays 
  Our next two Tables, 12 and 13, consider how the two UNE pricing regimes 
affect outlays on investment and new hiring over 1, 5, and 20 years relative to the level of 
these cost outlays that would have occurred with no competition (no CLEC entry).  The 
results are again displayed on a household-weighted basis.  Outlays refer here to all cost 
expenditures, whether these expenditures are entry costs, operating costs, or marginal 
costs.  These outlays will finance either new investment or the purchase of additional 
labor services.  In the case of 5-year and 20-year cost outlays, total outlays over those 
periods are measured in present value.  
According to table 12, most households – about two thirds of the total -- live in 
counties that experience increased spending on investment and new hiring in response to 
CLEC voice entry based on current UNE prices.  For example, 29.2 percent of 
households live in counties that enjoy a 30 percent or greater hike in telecom cost outlays 
in the first year after current UNE rates are introduced.  Going out 20 years, 17.1 percent 
of households live in such counties.  
While the table indicates a positive outlay response in those counties containing 
most of the nation’s households, some counties experience a reduction in outlays from 
the introduction of UNE-based voice competition.  The reason is that the price increases 
that arise in certain high UNE rate counties lead to cut backs in ILEC cost outlays that   43
more than offset the increase in CLEC outlays.   These results, should, again be taken 
with a grain of salt since they may simply reflect our overstatement of true TELRIC rates 
in the states in question.   
Table 13 shows that with TELRIC UNE rates, there is also much more telecom 
investment and hiring expenditures than with no competition.  There is also somewhat 
more of such expenditures than arises under current UNE rates.  In particularly, 
substantially fewer counties experience reductions in telecom investment and hiring 
outlays.  Table 14 presents the absolute present value dollar outlays on investment and 
hiring occurring over specified numbers of years under the regulated monopoly structure 
and under policies of actual and TELRIC UNE rates.  The table shows that TELRIC rates 
promote the greatest investment and hiring.  Over a 20 years period, the present value of 
investment is almost one quarter higher than with the ILECs having exclusive control of 
the market.  This 20-year outlay total is almost 5 percent higher with TELRIC UNE rates 
than with actual UNE rates.  The absolute numbers are also important.  According to the 
table, over a five-year period, the emergence of competition should mean $71 billion 
more telecom investment than under the monopoly structure that prevailed prior to the 
Telecom Act of 1996.  Over 20 years, competition should add $155 billion to aggregate 
investment. 
 
Conclusion    
Our conclusions number five.  First, there is strong empirical evidence that 
telecom competition promotes telecom investment.  Second, there are solid theoretical 
arguments to explain that outcome. Third, the policy debate on telecom investment and   44
regulation has been framed within a static model that fails to capture the dynamic and 
highly uncertain entry, pricing, and investment game being played by the ILECs, CLECs, 
and cable companies.  Consequently, it is difficult to assess the relevance of many prior 
telecom studies to the actual telecom market.   Fourth, a model rich enough to capture the 
complexities of the telecom industry must a) be solved on the computer and b) carefully 
calibrated if it is to provide real insight into the policies and other factors affecting that 
critical market.  We view this paper as a first step in that direction.  Fifth, our model 
indicates that were UNE rates set at their proper TELRIC level throughout the country, 
telecom entry, investment and employment outlays, and output would increase 
significantly and local voice prices would fall dramatically.  To be precise, telecom 
investment and employment outlays would increase by over one fifth in counties 
containing the majority of the U.S. population and by over one third in counties 
containing almost one third of the population.   
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Table 1  
Telecom Gross Investment, 1992-2002 
 
(billions of dollars) 
 
  Year                                CLECs                        ILECs                    Total 
1992 Na  17.5  17.5 
1993 Na  17.5  17.5 
1994 Na  17.5  17.5 
1995 Na  18.0  18.0 
1996 Na  20.8  20.8 
1997 5.0  21.5  26.5 
1998 9.2  22.2  31.4 
1999 16.8  22.8  39.6 
2000 21.7  27.8  49.5 
2001 12.3  28.1  40.4 
2002 10.7*  24.2*  34.9* 
           Source: ARMIS data provided by William Lehr.  ILEC investment includes investment by  
           Estimate for CLECs provided by William Lehr.   
           Estimate for ILECs based on a May 8, 2002 Banc of America Securities.  
           Na – not available, * indicates preliminary estimate for the year from those sources   47
Table 2 





















Average*  $20.95 $15.10  $5.85  25.27 
AL  $22.11 $21.13  $0.98  4.43 
AR  $19.28 $18.06  $1.22  6.33 
AZ  $25.49 $12.52  $12.97  50.88 
CA  $13.30 $12.29  $1.01  7.59 
CO  $22.40 $14.11  $8.29  37.01 
CT  $21.54 $15.41  $6.13  28.46 
DC  $16.52 $9.45  $7.07  42.80 
DE  $21.12 $14.31  $6.81  32.24 
FL  $24.52 $13.24  $11.28  46.00 
GA  $22.48 $14.61  $7.87  35.01 
IA  $24.59 $14.70  $9.89  40.22 
ID  $26.56 $16.94  $9.62  36.22 
IL  $12.69 $11.30  $1.39  10.95 
IN  $12.42  $14.16  - $1.74  - 14.01 
KS  $18.90 $15.24  $3.66  19.37 
KY  $19.19 $21.05  -  $1.86  (9.69) 
LA  $24.68 $18.05  $6.63  26.86 
MA  $24.71 $11.79  $12.92  52.29 
MD  $23.62 $13.01  $10.61  44.92 
ME  $22.08  $22.19  - $0.11  - $0.50 
MI  $13.90 $13.86  $0.04  0.29 
MN  $23.89 $13.79  $10.10  42.28 
MO  $19.83 $15.16  $4.67  23.55 
MS  $25.69  $27.39  - $1.70  - 6.62 
MT  $32.61 $21.26  $11.35  34.81 
NC  $22.08 $15.00  $7.08  32.07 
ND  $30.86 $16.34  $14.52  47.05 
NE  $28.19 $16.19  $12.00  42.57 
NH  $23.38 $17.18  $6.20  26.52 
NJ  $14.24 $12.04  $2.20  15.45 
NM  $27.26 $16.06  $11.20  41.09 
NV  $30.28 $19.19  $11.09  36.62 
NY  $18.12 $10.76  $7.36  40.62 
OH  $13.84 $12.75  $1.09  7.88 
OK  $23.24 $16.33  $6.91  29.73 
OR  $22.75 $13.40  $9.35  41.10 
PA  $20.47 $13.49  $6.98  34.10 
RI  $19.52 $12.96  $6.56  33.61 
SC  $24.89 $17.95  $6.94  27.88 
SD  $34.82 $17.18  $17.64  50.66   48
TN  $20.26 $17.79  $2.47  12.19 
TX  $20.74 $12.87  $7.87  37.95 
UT  $19.01 $12.44  $6.57  34.56 
VA  $23.09 $13.75  $9.34  40.45 
VT  $23.94 $24.37  ($0.43)  (1.80) 
WA  $19.93 $12.39  $7.54  37.83 
WI  $20.99 $13.23  $7.76  36.97 
WV  $45.64 $23.89  $21.75  47.66 
WY  $30.20 $22.63  $7.57  25.07 
         * Weighted by the number of households in each state.  
   49
Table 3  
 
The Impact of Actual and TELRIC UNE  
Rates on Retail Voice and Data Prices 
 
  
Voice Market  Data Market 








          
All states  1  $28.93 $30.61 $25.86 $50.00 $37.41 $38.56 
(3108 counties)  5   $31.78  $25.92  $35.47  $36.77 
 20   $31.92  $25.94  $34.78  $36.16 
          
HYHD  counties  1 $28.56 $29.97 $23.19 $50.00 $36.68 $39.43 
(222  counties)  5  $30.90  $23.12  $34.43  $36.86 
  20   $30.96  $23.12  $33.27  $35.88 
          
HYLD  counties  1 $28.21 $29.41 $25.06 $50.00 $37.64 $38.94 
(301  counties)  5  $30.68  $25.13  $36.05  $37.90 
  20   $30.75  $25.18  $35.54  $37.09 
          
LYHD  counties  1 $29.49 $31.05 $27.42 $50.00 $37.43 $37.67 
(186  counties)  5  $32.48  $27.48  $35.23  $36.02 
  20   $32.69  $27.48  $34.82  $35.80 
          
LYLD  counties  1 $29.26 $31.61 $28.85 $50.00 $38.41 $37.85 
(2399  counties) 5  $32.90  $29.12  $37.09  $36.90 
  20   $33.11  $29.17  $36.80  $36.58 
          
Alabama  1 $30.29 $33.17 $32.86 $50.00 $37.38 $37.23 
(  67  counties)  5  $35.26  $34.76  $35.08  $34.80 
  20   $35.38  $34.85  $34.95  $34.68 
          
Arizona  1 $29.76 $29.83 $23.92 $50.00 $40.02 $42.72 
(15  counties)  5  $38.39  $23.82  $34.03  $34.93 
  20   $38.39  $23.82  $34.03  $34.93 
          
Arkansas  1 $28.22 $32.96 $31.79 $50.00 $35.16 $35.40 
(75  counties)  5  $33.38  $32.31  $34.82  $34.59 
  20   $33.53  $32.45  $34.45  $34.37 
          
California  1 $25.17 $23.70 $22.64 $50.00 $39.51 $40.68 
(58  counties)  5  $23.79  $22.64  $38.07  $36.57 
  20   $23.79  $22.64  $34.34  $35.69 
          
Colorado  1 $29.76 $35.55 $25.53 $50.00 $34.28 $37.99 
(63  counties)  5  $36.88  $24.86  $32.97  $34.87 
  20   $36.98  $24.87  $32.87  $34.17 
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Connecticut  1 $29.37 $35.79 $26.76 $50.00 $33.28 $37.31 
(8  counties)  5  $36.46  $25.49  $32.58  $33.55 
  20   $36.46  $25.49  $32.58  $32.86 
          
DC  1 $28.78 $28.78 $19.45 $50.00 $40.00 $40.00 
  5  $28.78  $19.45  $40.00  $40.00 
  20   $28.78  $19.45  $40.00  $40.00 
          
Delaware  1 $28.78 $34.19 $25.64 $50.00 $34.47 $39.21 
(3  counties)  5  $34.19  $25.75  $34.47  $37.64 
  20   $34.19  $25.75  $34.47  $37.64 
          
Florida  1 $30.29 $31.87 $26.97 $50.00 $38.59 $39.24 
(67  counties)  5  $35.51  $26.62  $35.64  $37.91 
  20   $35.51  $26.65  $35.64  $37.51 
          
Georgia  1 $30.29 $34.81 $27.24 $50.00 $34.96 $37.44 
(159  counties)  5  $35.97  $27.13  $33.76  $36.25 
  20   $36.09  $27.15  $33.63  $34.01 
          
Idaho  1 $29.76 $38.12 $31.28 $50.00 $35.76 $35.47 
(44  counties)  5  $38.90  $31.44  $35.27  $34.92 
  20   $38.90  $31.51  $35.27  $34.48 
          
Illinois  1 $28.40 $23.09 $21.52 $50.00 $41.30 $39.60 
(102  counties)  5  $23.00  $21.47  $34.24  $38.28 
  20   $23.00  $21.47  $33.38  $34.20 
          
Indiana  1 $28.40 $23.32 $26.68 $50.00 $39.30 $37.48 
(92  counties)  5  $23.26  $26.80  $38.77  $34.43 
  20   $23.28  $26.80  $37.37  $34.12 
          
Iowa  1 $29.76 $36.35 $27.92 $50.00 $35.94 $36.81 
(99  counties)  5  $38.00  $27.91  $34.68  $34.82 
  20   $38.20  $27.91  $34.53  $33.80 
          
Kansas  1 $28.22 $32.86 $27.41 $50.00 $33.04 $33.66 
(105  counties)  5  $33.24  $27.50  $32.54  $33.17 
  20   $33.24  $27.50  $32.54  $33.08 
          
Kentucky  1 $30.29 $31.68 $32.46 $50.00 $39.62 $39.48 
(120  counties)  5  $33.01  $34.06  $37.09  $37.42 
  20   $33.06  $34.25  $37.00  $37.17 
          
Louisiana  1 $30.29 $36.63 $32.40 $50.00 $35.20 $34.25 
(64  parishes)  5  $37.74  $32.48  $34.31  $34.01 
  20   $37.98  $32.48  $34.12  $34.01   51
          
Maine  1 $30.92 $34.68 $34.56 $50.00 $35.85 $36.09 
(16  counties)  5  $35.18  $35.06  $35.24  $35.48 
  20   $36.07  $36.17  $34.16  $34.16 
          
Maryland  1 $28.78 $35.70 $24.24 $50.00 $34.93 $39.70 
(24  counties)  5  $36.44  $24.24  $34.37  $39.67 
  20   $36.44  $24.24  $34.37  $39.67 
          
Massachussetts  1 $30.92 $36.28 $21.82 $50.00 $35.43 $39.94 
(14  counties)  5  $39.28  $21.82  $32.87  $39.08 
  20   $39.68  $21.82  $32.53  $39.08 
          
Michigan  1 $28.40 $24.65 $24.51 $50.00 $37.68 $37.75 
(83  counties)  5  $24.41  $24.37  $34.23  $34.38 
  20   $24.42  $24.38  $32.99  $33.07 
          
Minnesota  1 $29.76 $34.99 $25.33 $50.00 $36.33 $38.86 
(87  counties)  5  $37.13  $25.24  $34.58  $36.81 
  20   $37.23  $25.29  $34.49  $36.52 
          
Mississippi  1 $30.29 $34.29 $35.13 $50.00 $37.98 $37.89 
(82  counties)  5  $38.03  $39.54  $35.29  $35.15 
  20   $38.36  $39.71  $35.05  $35.05 
          
Missouri  1 $28.22 $33.42 $28.18 $50.00 $34.79 $35.66 
(115  counties)  5  $34.08  $27.87  $34.05  $34.01 
  20   $34.19  $27.88  $33.92  $33.81 
          
Montana  1 $29.76 $32.45 $32.92 $50.00 $40.37 $37.61 
(56  counties)  5  $39.91  $34.69  $37.24  $35.56 
  20   $41.05  $34.69  $36.76  $35.56 
          
Nebraska  1 $29.76 $35.20 $30.44 $50.00 $38.66 $37.98 
(93  counties)  5  $35.25  $30.81  $38.64  $36.05 
  20   $35.25  $30.81  $38.64  $36.05 
          
Nevada  1 $25.17 $25.44 $25.29 $50.00 $40.06 $40.06 
(17  counties)  5  $25.44  $25.49  $40.06  $39.89 
  20   $25.44  $25.49  $40.06  $39.89 
          
New  Hampshire  1 $30.92 $34.66 $30.62 $50.00 $36.60 $36.44 
(10  counties)  5  $37.29  $30.91  $33.97  $33.03 
  20   $37.95  $30.91  $33.30  $33.03 
          
          
            52
New  Jersey  1 $28.78 $25.08 $22.06 $50.00 $39.52 $39.83 
(21  county)  5  $25.11  $22.06  $36.35  $38.97 
  20   $25.11  $22.06  $35.54  $38.32 
          
New  Mexico  1 $29.76 $31.68 $30.66 $50.00 $39.95 $35.23 
(33  counties)  5  $38.00  $30.76  $36.16  $34.58 
  20   $38.36  $30.76  $35.95  $34.58 
          
New  York  1 $30.92 $30.82 $22.87 $50.00 $37.71 $40.61 
(62  counties)  5  $31.00  $22.87  $35.62  $39.30 
  20   $31.02  $22.87  $35.54  $39.30 
          
North  Carolina  1 $30.92 $32.56 $29.14 $50.00 $37.83 $37.21 
(100  counties)  5  $33.44  $29.13  $36.86  $36.10 
  20   $33.69  $29.13  $36.58  $35.52 
          
North  Dakota  1 $29.76 $37.28 $30.50 $50.00 $39.56 $37.12 
(53  counties)  5  $40.54  $30.72  $38.05  $36.10 
  20   $40.54  $30.77  $38.05  $35.84 
          
Ohio  1 $28.40 $26.63 $23.83 $50.00 $37.50 $39.12 
(88  counties)  5  $26.69  $23.82  $35.80  $39.08 
  20   $26.69  $23.82  $35.76  $39.08 
          
Oklahoma  1 $28.22 $34.21 $29.81 $50.00 $35.26 $34.24 
(77  counties)  5  $36.14  $29.99  $33.82  $33.80 
  20   $36.26  $29.99  $33.73  $33.80 
          
Oregon  1 $29.76 $32.55 $26.20 $50.00 $37.52 $37.57 
(36  counties)  5  $34.40  $26.17  $35.78  $35.84 
  20   $34.58  $26.17  $35.62  $35.84 
          
Pennsylvania  1 $28.78 $30.85 $27.15 $50.00 $38.37 $38.61 
(67  counties)  5  $31.49  $27.13  $37.66  $38.29 
  20   $32.24  $27.13  $36.81  $38.29 
          
Rhode  Island  1 $30.92 $31.64 $26.18 $50.00 $38.19 $35.02 
(5  counties)  5  $31.95  $26.18  $37.54  $35.02 
  20   $34.07  $26.18  $33.14  $35.02 
          
South  Carolina  1 $30.29 $33.03 $32.06 $50.00 $38.51 $35.66 
(45  counties)  5  $36.56  $32.38  $35.76  $34.76 
  20   $37.08  $32.45  $35.35  $34.55 
          
South  Dakota  1 $29.76 $42.21 $31.29 $50.00 $38.44 $37.79 
(66  counties)  5  $44.12  $31.74  $37.74  $36.41 
  20   $45.14  $31.74  $37.36  $36.41   53
          
Tennessee  1 $30.29 $33.39 $32.04 $50.00 $35.66 $35.05 
(95  counties)  5  $34.05  $32.18  $34.61  $34.42 
  20   $34.13  $32.18  $34.54  $34.42 
          
Texas  1 $28.22 $33.92 $24.03 $50.00 $33.50 $36.98 
(254  counties)  5  $34.68  $23.81  $32.74  $34.65 
  20   $34.77  $23.81  $32.65  $33.57 
          
Utah  1 $29.76 $32.99 $22.90 $50.00 $34.26 $39.55 
(29  counties)  5  $33.57  $22.90  $33.24  $35.22 
  20   $33.80  $22.90  $32.82  $35.22 
          
Vermont  1 $30.92 $33.97 $33.50 $50.00 $38.42 $38.99 
(14  counties)  5  $37.94  $38.33  $34.71  $34.71 
  20   $37.94  $38.33  $34.71  $34.71 
          
Virginia  1 $28.78 $32.14 $26.60 $50.00 $38.26 $40.07 
(135 counties/cities)   5    $32.60  $26.53    $37.89  $39.70 
  20   $33.01  $26.60  $37.57  $39.39 
          
Washington  1 $29.76 $32.39 $23.38 $50.00 $36.38 $39.76 
(39  counties)  5  $34.19  $23.27  $33.77  $39.67 
  20   $34.19  $23.32  $33.77  $39.59 
          
West  Virginia  1 $28.78 $34.36 $30.83 $50.00 $41.85 $41.71 
(55  counties)  5  $35.81  $31.09  $41.62  $41.58 
  20   $35.93  $31.09  $41.60  $41.58 
          
Wisconsin  1 $28.40 $32.61 $24.13 $50.00 $35.97 $39.29 
(72  counties)  5  $35.23  $24.11  $33.39  $38.27 
  20   $35.44  $24.11  $33.18  $37.80 
          
Wyoming  1 $29.76 $40.45 $36.78 $50.00 $34.73 $32.84 
(23  counties)  5  $44.35  $36.78  $32.84  $32.84 
  20   $44.35  $36.78  $32.84  $32.84   
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Table 4 
Annual Consumer and Business Voice Savings from  
































New Hampshire  58.9 
New Jersey  443.3 
New Mexico  16.5 
New York  1,759.3 
North Carolina  280.6 





Rhode Island  63.8 
South Carolina  36.1 







West Virginia  48.0 
Wisconsin 518.8 
Wyoming 14.9   55
 
Table 5  
Competitive Structure in the Voice Market 
   Actual UNE rate  TELRIC UNE rate 
    percent of households with  percent of households with 










ILEC & 2 
CLECs 
              
All  states  1  36.48% 51.85%  11.57% 19.29%  63.28%  17.37% 
(3108  counties)  5  20.94% 58.60%  20.43% 13.51%  61.08%  25.16% 
  20  19.01% 58.76%  22.22% 13.47%  55.43%  31.10% 
              
HYHD counties  1  15.22%  64.55%  20.24%  1.00%  69.90%  29.09% 
(222  counties)  5  3.76% 59.36%  36.88% 0.00%  61.83% 38.17% 
  20  3.09% 57.76%  39.16% 0.00%  49.78% 50.22% 
              
HYLD counties  1  33.56%  60.01%  6.43%  13.95%  77.92%  7.66% 
(301 counties)  5  16.52%  74.44%  9.04%  10.14%  73.93%  15.93% 
 20  15.35%  71.95%  12.70%  9.33%  69.58%  21.09% 
              
LYHD counties  1  53.12%  43.69%  2.86%  32.46%  58.22%  9.31% 
(186 counties)  5  31.69%  59.52%  8.79%  23.70%  55.57%  20.11% 
  20  28.06% 61.39%  10.55% 24.32%  53.60%  22.08% 
              
LYLD counties  1  55.70%  36.85%  7.45%  37.72%  52.72%  9.52% 
(2399 counties)  5  39.43%  51.46%  8.99%  26.55%  61.37%  11.70% 
 20  36.79%  53.76%  9.45%  26.14%  60.97%  12.88% 
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Table 6 
Type of CLEC Entry 
 
   Actual UNE Rate  TELRIC UNE Rate 
    Percentage of Households in Counties with CLECs Entering As  Percentage of Households in Counties with CLECs Entering As 
State  Year  V only  D only  V and D  V and V  D and D  no CLECs  V only  D only  V and D  V and V  D and D  no CLECs 
                     
All states  1  17.59%  34.26% 6.36% 0.00% 5.22%  36.58%  43.99%  19.30%  12.44% 0.00% 4.93%  19.35% 
(3108 counties)  5  8.82%  49.77%  15.69% 0.00% 4.74%  20.97%  36.23%  24.85%  22.18% 0.00% 2.28%  13.76% 
  20  7.04%  51.73%  17.48% 0.00% 4.74%  19.01%  30.30%  25.13%  28.82% 0.00% 2.28%  13.47% 
                     
HYHD counties  1  27.83%  36.71%  14.17% 0.00% 6.06%  15.22%  66.17% 3.74% 25.67%  0.00% 3.42%  1.00% 
(222  counties)  5  11.19%  48.17%  31.30% 0.00% 5.58% 3.76%  57.09%  4.74%  38.06%  0.00%  0.11% 0.00% 
  20  8.91%  48.84%  33.57% 0.00% 5.58%  3.09% 45.04%  4.74%  50.11%  0.00%  0.11%  0.00% 
                     
HYLD  counties  1  30.29%  29.72% 2.92% 0.00% 3.51%  33.56% 63.47% 14.45%  4.67%  0.00%  2.99%  14.42% 
(301  counties)  5  27.69%  46.75% 6.48% 0.00% 2.56%  16.52% 55.67% 18.26%  13.80%  0.00%  2.13%  10.14% 
  20  24.02%  47.93%  10.14% 0.00% 2.56%  15.35% 50.51% 19.07%  18.95%  0.00%  2.13%  9.33% 
                     
LYHD  counties  1  10.62%  32.97% 0.71% 0.00% 2.16%  53.54% 32.39% 25.83%  4.47%  0.00%  4.85%  32.46% 
(186  counties)  5  5.12%  54.41% 7.39% 0.00% 1.40%  31.69% 20.46% 33.98%  21.24%  0.00%  0.00%  24.32% 
  20  3.36%  58.03% 9.14% 0.00% 1.40%  28.06% 19.62% 33.98%  22.08%  0.00%  0.00%  24.32% 
                     
LYLD  counties  1  3.74%  33.58% 0.37% 0.00% 7.05%  55.27% 13.68% 39.04%  1.58%  0.00%  7.94%  37.77% 
(2399  counties)  5  2.20%  49.61% 1.98% 0.00% 6.97%  39.24% 11.49% 49.87%  4.13%  0.00%  7.57%  26.93% 
  20  1.74%  52.29% 2.44% 0.00% 6.97%  36.55% 10.31% 50.66%  5.31%  0.00%  7.57%  26.14% 
 
“V” denotes “voice” 
“D” denotes “data”   57
Table 7 
The CLEC Share of the Voice Market 
State  Year  Actual UNE Rates  TELRIC UNE Rates 
   V  onDy D  onDy  V and D  V and V  D and D  Total share  V onDy D  onDy  V and D  V and V  D and D  Total share 
All states  1  3.71% 4.77% 1.36% 0.00% 0.82%  10.66%  9.75% 3.13% 2.73% 0.00% 0.91%  16.51% 
(3108 counties)  5  1.89% 6.87% 3.31% 0.00% 0.73%  12.79%  8.10% 4.01% 4.94% 0.00% 0.41%  17.46% 
  20  1.50% 7.14% 3.69% 0.00% 0.73%  13.06%  6.83% 4.05% 6.20% 0.00% 0.41%  17.49% 
                      
HYHD counties  1  5.81%  5.03% 3.04% 0.00% 0.95%  14.83%  14.68% 0.59%  5.68%  0.00%  0.62%  21.57% 
(222 counties)  5  2.36%  6.53%  6.59%  0.00%  0.86%  16.34%  12.76% 0.76%  8.26%  0.00%  0.02%  21.80% 
 20  1.88%  6.62%  7.07%  0.00%  0.86%  16.43%  10.06% 0.76% 10.95% 0.00%  0.02%  21.79% 
                      
HYLD counties  1  6.51%  4.07%  0.59%  0.00%  0.59%  11.76%  13.85% 2.27%  1.01%  0.00%  0.53%  17.65% 
(301 counties)  5  5.95%  6.37%  1.36%  0.00%  0.40%  14.08%  12.21% 2.88%  2.91%  0.00%  0.38%  18.38% 
 20  5.17%  6.53%  2.14%  0.00%  0.40%  14.24%  11.10% 2.99%  4.02%  0.00%  0.38%  18.49% 
                      
LYHD counties  1  2.28%  4.67%  0.15%  0.00%  0.34%  7.44%  7.16% 4.18% 0.91% 0.00% 0.94%  13.20% 
(186 counties)  5  1.13%  7.63%  1.55%  0.00%  0.19%  10.51%  4.61% 5.46% 4.51% 0.00% 0.00%  14.59% 
 20  0.74%  8.15%  1.94%  0.00%  0.19%  11.03%  4.43% 5.46% 4.70% 0.00% 0.00%  14.59% 
                      
LYLD counties  1  0.82%  4.76%  0.08%  0.00%  1.10%  6.75%  3.08% 6.28% 0.34% 0.00% 1.61%  11.31% 
(2399 counties)  5  0.48%  6.95%  0.43%  0.00%  1.08%  8.95%  2.61% 7.98% 1.09% 0.00% 1.35%  13.04% 
 20  0.38%  7.31%  0.53%  0.00%  1.08%  9.31%  2.35% 8.10% 1.35% 0.00% 1.35%  13.15% 
 
“V” denotes “voice” 
“D” denotes “data” 
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Table 8 
 
The CLEC Share of the Data Market 
 
Actual UNE Rates  TELRIC UNE Rates 














All states  1  8.47%  2.32%  2.34% 13.13% 4.98%  4.35%  2.80% 12.13% 
(3108 counties)  5  12.06%  4.33%  2.07% 18.45% 6.27%  5.49%  1.29% 13.05% 
  20  12.51%  4.03%  2.07% 18.61% 6.33%  6.65%  1.29% 14.27% 
                
HYHD counties  1  8.47%  5.11%  2.16%  15.75%  0.86% 9.02% 1.95% 11.83% 
(222 counties)  5  11.12%  8.83%  1.89%  21.83%  1.09% 8.91% 0.06% 10.07% 
 20  11.27%  7.75%  1.89%  20.91%  1.09% 11.57% 0.06%  12.72% 
                
HYLD counties  1  6.94%  1.10%  1.85%  9.89%  3.41% 1.84% 1.66%  6.91% 
(301 counties)  5  10.87%  1.76%  1.31%  13.94%  4.29% 3.82% 1.17%  9.28% 
 20  11.14%  2.35%  1.31%  14.81%  4.48% 4.39% 1.17% 10.04% 
                
LYHD counties  1  7.61%  0.31%  0.90%  8.82%  5.96% 1.35% 2.77% 10.08% 
(186 counties)  5  12.56%  1.70%  0.47%  14.73%  7.84% 5.07% 0.00% 12.91% 
 20  13.39%  2.11%  0.47%  15.97%  7.84% 5.10% 0.00% 12.94% 
                
LYLD counties  1  9.70%  0.16%  3.99%  13.85%  10.94% 0.60%  4.49%  16.03% 
(2399 counties)  5  13.46%  0.54%  3.94%  17.94%  13.46% 1.19%  4.28%  18.94% 
 20  14.10%  0.56%  3.94%  18.61%  13.65% 1.24%  4.28%  19.16% 
 
“V” denotes “voice” 
“D” denotes “data” 
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Table 9 
Change in Voice Price Relative to the Regulated Monopoly Price  
Assuming Actual UNE Rates 
 
State Year  Percentage of Households in Counties Where Price Has Changed by: 
   -(30-20)% -(20-10)% -(10-0)% 0-10  % 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% >100% 
                   
All states  1  5.58%  7.41% 49.29% 3.76% 6.83%  18.67% 7.40% 0.44% 0.21% 0.17% 0.01%  0.12% 
(3108 counties)  5  5.81%  7.62% 33.53% 5.16% 8.87%  23.94%  13.47% 0.77% 0.45% 0.20% 0.01%  0.16% 
  20  5.81%  7.62% 31.60% 5.24% 9.26%  25.05%  13.79% 0.79% 0.47% 0.21% 0.01%  0.16% 
                   
HYHD counties  1  7.95%  11.27%  39.77% 2.95% 7.51%  22.71% 7.41% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
(222 counties)  5  7.95%  11.75%  27.83%  3.18%  9.07%  27.33%  12.47% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
 20  7.95%  11.75%  27.16%  3.18%  9.07%  27.55%  12.91% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
                   
HYLD counties  1  6.75%  9.12%  52.75%  1.97%  4.06%  16.49% 7.60% 0.48% 0.07% 0.68% 0.02%  0.00% 
(301 counties)  5  7.36%  8.85%  35.37%  3.70%  5.21%  24.67%  12.66% 1.39% 0.07% 0.68% 0.02%  0.00% 
 20  7.36%  8.85%  34.20%  3.70%  6.15%  24.83%  12.74% 1.39% 0.07% 0.68% 0.02%  0.00% 
                   
LYHD counties  1  4.19%  6.69%  54.72%  6.35%  3.71%  15.74% 8.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
(186 counties)  5  4.92%  6.83%  33.00%  10.36%  6.24%  20.60%  17.13% 0.92% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
 20  4.92%  6.83%  29.38%  10.36%  7.23%  23.18%  17.18% 0.92% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
                   
LYLD counties  1  2.76%  1.59%  58.07%  3.38%  9.36%  15.70% 6.66% 0.83% 0.77% 0.41% 0.03%  0.46% 
(2399 counties)  5  2.81%  1.58%  42.05%  4.22%  11.98%  21.38%  12.13% 0.97% 1.65% 0.50% 0.03%  0.57% 
 20  2.81%  1.58%  39.41%  4.51%  12.29%  22.88%  12.59% 1.04% 1.73% 0.56% 0.03%  0.58% 
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Table 10 
 
 Change in Voice Price Relative to the Regulated Monopoly Price  
Assuming TELRIC UNE Rates 
 
  Percentage of Households in Counties Where Price Has Changed by: 
State  Year -(40-30)% -(30-20)% -(20-10)% -(10-0)%  0-10  %  10-20%  20-30%  30-40% 
            
All states  1  5.48%  19.17%  33.71%  29.12% 8.39% 2.96% 0.56% 0.56% 
(3108 counties)  5  5.48%  19.57%  34.57%  24.33% 9.91% 4.10% 0.83% 0.96% 
  20  5.48%  19.57%  34.57%  24.29% 9.99% 4.21% 0.91% 0.98% 
            
HYHD  counties 1  8.70% 32.55% 51.14%  5.36% 1.53% 0.46% 0.25% 0.00% 
(222  counties)  5  8.70%  32.55%  54.01% 2.16% 1.73% 0.46% 0.38% 0.00% 
  20  8.70%  32.55%  54.01% 2.16% 1.73% 0.46% 0.38% 0.00% 
            
HYLD  counties  1  2.40%  15.61%  50.50%  19.73% 7.99% 2.45% 0.07% 0.77% 
(301  counties)  5  2.40%  15.61%  51.32%  17.19% 9.25% 2.80% 0.07% 1.37% 
  20  2.40%  15.61%  51.32%  16.38% 9.25% 2.80% 0.88% 1.37% 
            
LYHD  counties  1  4.32% 12.19% 24.26% 42.96% 12.67%  3.23%  0.00%  0.38% 
(186  counties)  5  4.32% 13.88% 22.56% 37.24% 14.73%  5.97%  0.00%  0.68% 
  20  4.32% 13.88% 22.56% 37.86% 14.73%  5.97%  0.00%  0.68% 
            
LYLD  counties 1  2.56% 5.87%  10.52%  55.77%  15.34% 6.71% 1.67% 1.52% 
(2399  counties) 5  2.56% 5.92%  10.52%  48.66%  18.51% 8.49% 2.46% 2.54% 
  20  2.56% 5.92%  10.52%  48.23%  18.78% 8.89% 2.51% 2.59%   61
Table 11 
The Change in Voice Prices in Switching from Actual to TELRIC UNE Rates 
 
Percentage of Households in Counties Where Price Has Changed by 
State Year 
-(50-40)% -(40-30)% -(30-20)% -(20-10)% -(10-0)% 0-10  % 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 
All states  1  3.09% 18.16% 16.84%  8.28%  46.98%  4.85%  0.57%  0.45%  0.63% 
(3108 counties)  5  7.80% 23.29% 11.65%  7.02%  44.22%  4.66%  0.16%  0.07%  0.86% 
  20  7.91% 23.43% 11.83%  7.94%  43.25%  4.65%  0.11%  0.05%  0.82% 
                 
HYHD counties  1  5.75%  30.29% 18.30%  3.58%  39.73%  2.13% 0.22% 0.00% 0.00% 
(222  counties)  5  11.71%  36.39% 8.19% 2.64% 39.11%  1.96% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
  20  11.84%  36.64% 8.06% 2.68%  39.11%  1.67%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
                 
HYLD  counties  1  1.54% 19.43%  9.33% 14.34% 45.86%  6.73% 0.79% 0.30% 1.21% 
(301  counties)  5  3.96%  28.77% 5.78% 7.92% 46.66%  5.67% 0.00% 0.00% 1.23% 
  20  3.96%  29.05% 5.73% 7.78%  45.77%  6.47%  0.00%  0.00%  1.23% 
                 
LYHD  counties  1  2.29%  8.47% 19.82% 10.92% 51.13%  4.80% 0.08% 0.75% 1.32% 
(186  counties)  5  9.58% 12.92% 14.43%  9.25% 46.17%  4.95% 0.00% 0.00% 2.08% 
  20  9.58% 12.92% 14.48% 12.84%  43.16%  4.95%  0.00%  0.00%  2.08% 
                 
LYLD  counties  1  0.21%  7.49% 14.97% 11.12% 54.54%  8.43% 1.46% 0.91% 0.82% 
(2399  counties)  5  1.60% 11.22% 15.91% 11.48% 49.27%  8.19% 0.61% 0.26% 1.01% 
  20  1.79% 11.28% 16.69% 11.84%  48.56%  8.36%  0.42%  0.18%  0.88% 
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Table 12 
Change in Investment and Hiring Outlays Relative to the Monopoly Level with Actual UNE Rates 
 
Percentage of Households in Counties Where Investment Has Changed by:   
State Year -(50-40)% -(40-30)% -(30-20)% -(20-10)% -(10-0)% 0-10  % 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-90% 90-100% >100% 
All states  1  0.00%  0.00%  30.35%  5.80%  0.31% 8.47%  10.03%  16.00%  15.81% 5.70% 3.72% 1.58% 0.12% 0.09%  0.50%  1.44% 
(3108 counties)  5  0.00%  0.06%  15.07%  6.05%  0.61% 8.46%  21.55%  30.43%  10.40% 4.30% 1.03% 0.05% 0.82% 0.91%  0.25%  0.00% 
 20  0.00%  0.04%  13.16%  5.53%  1.02% 3.02%  25.66%  34.67%  11.07% 3.57% 0.20% 0.15% 1.20% 0.61%  0.09%  0.00% 
                          
HYHD counties  1  0.00%  0.00%  13.56% 1.66%  0.00%  13.74%  16.76% 21.93% 20.65%  5.64% 4.24% 1.71% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0.11% 
(222  counties)  5  0.00% 0.00% 2.50% 1.26%  0.48%  12.76%  20.64%  42.95%  12.64% 4.96% 1.71% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11%  0.00%  0.00% 
  20  0.00% 0.00% 1.83% 1.26%  0.38%  1.34%  28.41%  48.28%  13.81% 4.58% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11%  0.00%  0.00% 
                          
HYLD  counties  1  0.00%  0.00% 21.22% 12.34% 0.00%  11.60%  16.48%  10.75%  20.58% 3.38% 1.62% 0.05% 0.15% 0.10%  0.77%  0.96% 
(301 counties)  5  0.00%  0.00%  5.01%  14.09%  0.24%  11.46%  30.40%  28.73% 6.50% 1.58% 0.00% 0.19% 0.90% 0.39%  0.50%  0.00% 
 20  0.00%  0.00%  3.98%  11.37%  1.04%  9.41%  30.03%  34.61% 5.72% 1.86% 0.00% 0.19% 0.90% 0.73%  0.17%  0.00% 
                          
LYHD  counties  1  0.00%  0.00% 41.93% 10.16% 1.03%  5.24%  5.38%  19.40% 7.54% 7.20% 1.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
(186  counties) 5  0.01%  0.00% 20.49% 10.73% 1.03%  3.43%  29.76%  23.34% 9.53% 1.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
  20  0.00%  0.01% 16.86% 10.16% 1.81%  4.02%  29.85%  26.07%  10.77% 0.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  #VALUE! 
                          
LYLD counties  1  0.00%  0.00%  49.07%  6.27%  0.28%  2.15%  1.61% 5.81%  13.91% 5.26% 5.32% 3.21% 0.40% 0.29%  1.59%  4.83% 
(2399  counties) 5  0.00%  0.23%  32.89%  6.75%  0.56% 5.21%  13.08%  17.96% 8.99% 6.38% 1.20% 0.14% 2.76% 3.07%  0.77%  0.00% 
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Table 13 
The Change in Investment and Hiring Outlays Relative to the Monopoly Level with TELRIC UNE Rates 
 
Percentage of Households in Counties Where Investment Has Changed By 
State Year  -(50-40)% -(40-30)% -(30-20)% -(20-10)% -(10-0)%  0-10  % 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50%  50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-90% 90-100%  >100% 
                               
All states  1  0.00%  0.00%  14.04%  5.17%  0.06% 9.48%  21.40%  19.23% 9.61% 12.66% 4.05% 1.43% 0.55% 0.05%  0.18%  2.01% 
(3108 counties)  5  0.01% 0.40% 8.50% 4.92% 0.12%  1.96%  21.88%  30.27%  20.09%  8.14%  1.33%  0.16%  0.20%  1.06%  0.90%  0.06% 
  20  0.00% 0.29% 8.34% 4.80% 0.24%  1.39%  17.87%  33.59%  25.73%  4.61%  0.86%  0.07%  0.34%  1.47%  0.36%  0.03% 
                              
HYHD  counties  1  0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 0.77% 0.00% 15.97% 26.48% 35.39% 6.18% 11.16% 3.72% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.11% 
(222  counties)  5  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  2.38%  23.20%  39.89%  23.74% 10.68% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.11%  0.00% 
  20  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  2.30%  19.14%  43.02%  31.52%  3.90% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.11%  0.00% 
                              
HYLD  counties  1  0.00% 0.00% 4.38% 9.57% 0.00%  4.42%  44.02%  16.62% 8.42%  7.27% 2.55% 0.31% 0.00% 0.22%  0.14%  1.63% 
(301  counties)  5  0.00% 0.00% 1.04% 9.56% 0.29%  3.04%  43.60%  22.43%  13.01%  4.74% 0.31% 0.00% 0.36% 0.86%  0.77%  0.00% 
  20  0.00% 0.00% 0.24% 9.09% 1.27%  1.65%  36.45%  28.34%  18.55%  2.17% 0.24% 0.15% 0.21% 1.29%  0.33%  0.00% 
                              
LYHD  counties 1  0.00%  0.00% 22.30% 10.16%  0.00%  7.88%  19.29% 9.35%  13.47% 11.36% 6.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
(186  counties)  5  0.00%  0.62% 13.54% 10.16%  0.00%  0.33%  20.80%  32.67%  13.83%  8.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
  20  0.00%  0.35% 13.81% 10.16%  0.00%  0.00%  17.25%  33.07%  19.78%  5.58% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
                              
LYLD  counties  1  0.00% 0.00%  31.23% 6.20% 0.23%  2.62%  8.09% 3.85%  11.96% 17.82% 3.23% 5.19% 2.05% 0.10%  0.64%  6.74% 
(2399  counties)  5  0.04% 0.97%  19.60% 6.44% 0.35%  2.34%  13.67%  16.13%  22.18%  5.48% 4.81% 0.57% 0.63% 3.63%  2.93%  0.23% 
  20  0.00% 0.79%  19.05% 6.15% 0.48%  1.08%  10.38%  21.38%  24.30%  5.66% 3.11% 0.21% 1.21% 5.02%  1.07%  0.12%   64
 
Table 14 
Present Value of Investment and Hiring Outlays Made by Specified Years 
 
State  Year  Actual UNE Rates  TELRIC UNE Rates  Monopoly 
        
All states  1   $          82,958,140,000    $      87,898,900,000    $      72,467,040,000  
(3108 counties)  5   $        349,427,220,000    $    367,314,900,000    $    296,763,220,000  
 10   $        560,126,980,000    $    585,532,900,000    $    471,994,980,000  
 20   $        758,641,820,000    $    791,788,900,000    $    636,569,420,000  
 